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98A PRIMRR ON NUTRITION POLICY
IN THE UNITED STArES *
by
Howard D. Leathers **
INTRODUCTION
Recently students and makers of agricultural
struggling with an issue which raises fundamental
policy have been
questions about the
basis for and direction of U.S. agricultural policy: Can nutrition
knowledge be used as a basis for planning food production and di.stri-
1/
button in the United States? - The currenc leadership in the USDA
has publicized its belief that government should move in this direction.
Carol Tucker Foreman, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture and leading
administration advocate for nutrition policy~ describes the view from
the top:
Secretary Bergland has made a number of speeches
in which he has repeated the same theme, that this country
needs to develop a policy around human nutrit~.on, build a
food policy from that , and use those policies as a frame-
worlcaround which the build the Nation’s farm policy. He
* A paper submitted in Agricultural Economics 8-375, Food and
Agricultural Policy, May 1979.
~ Dairy Division, Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S. Department
of Agriculture. The views expressed in this paper are the author’s and






ion an earlier draft) ~y )?r~fessorWillard-W. Co~hrane, Professor
Sexauer, Professor Jean Kinsey, Thomas G. Thompson, Jean C.
and Anastasia Tenzutuo Navele.
One of the sessions at the 1978 meetings of the American Agri-
Economics Association addressed the question, “Can Human Nutrition
Be the Leading Goal for Food and Agricultural-Policies?” Published papers
include: H. S. Olcott, I!What1s Known about Human Nutritional Needs?” ;
Philip L. White, llHumanNutrition and Health”; Sol Chafkin~ “Nutrition
Policies, Programs, and Politics”; and R. M. A. Loyns, “Discussion,” in
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 60, No. 5, December 1978,
pp. 800-812.-2-
usually follows by saying, “r~heEroubl.e$ folks, i that
we’ve been going it backwards all these years. 7 II~
In other words, it’s not “what’s good for farmers” chat should guide
agricultural policy; rather, it’s IIwhat!s good fOr Consumers.” (Pre-
sumably, these two guides may sometimes lead to the same result.)
The. logic behind proposals for a nutrition-based food policy may
be summarized: llFood is Produced in order to feed people. Therefore,
the overall effectiveness of a food production system can be measured
scientifically objectively, by measuring people’s nutritional status.”
This logic is flawed. Food is consumed for pleasure as well as nutrition;
people may freely choose to consume nonnutritious food. Under some
circumstances, improvement in nutrition for one individual may be at the
expense of another group’s nutrition. The goal of improved nutrition is
at odds with other public policy goals. For these reasons, nutrition
knowledge cannot provide an objective, “scientific” basis for guiding
foc.ad policy decisions. Good nutrition may well be a leading goal of
agricultural. policy, but it cannot be the only goal. Difficult subjective
or political decisions must be made about the trade-offs between opposing
goals .
Foreman makes clear her conviction that agricultural policy should
be transformed from a farm-oriented policy to a nutrition-oriented policy.
She i-sless specific about
Foreman’s nutrition policy
the mechanics of such a transformation. Presumably,
~/ would proceed as follows:
&/ Carol Tucker Foreman, !lHu~n Nutrition and Food po~icY~”
Amicultural Food Policy Review, ESCS-AFPR-2, U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Washington, D.C., 1978, p. 17.
~/ Ibid.> p. 17.-3-
(1) determine how much and what kinds of food are necessary
to meet nutritional needs here and abroad,
(2) adjust farm policies to bring about production of the
desired quantity of each type of food,
(3) make food available at a reasonable price, and
(4) ensure that the poor have incomes high enough to allow
adequate nutrition.
In this paper, I will examine the problems and potentialities for trans-
forming a farm-oriented agricultural policy into a nutrition-oriented
agricultural policy.
The first two sections of this paper will define the nutritional
problem in the United States from a nucriti.onist’s point of view and
set forward the tenets of nutrition science on which the rest of my dis-
cussion is based. I believe that these tenets are sufficiently general
to be accepted by most nutrition experts. If anything, my outline of
nutrition knowledge underestimates the possible contribution of nutrition
science to agricultural policymaking.
The third section of the paper will contain an economist’s
redefinition of the nutrition problem h the United Statea. Economists do $
not agree with nutritionists about the definition of che term “optimal
nutrition.” The economic justifications for government intervention
to improve nutrition will be discussed in this section. The fourth section
will review the economics literature on programs to improve nutrition.
Traditional remedies for the nutrition problem may be divided into poverty
programs and education programs.-4”
An effective nutrition policy could be designed using only programs
to improve nutrition among the poor and nutrition education programs.
The recent suggestions about a nutrition-based food policy go far beyond
espousal of food stamps and nutrition education programs, which do not
directly affect food production decisions. A nutrition-based food policy,
as the term usually is used$ implies a wholesale reworking of agricultural
policy affecting production and distribution of food.
In the fifth section, we will examine the feasibility of designing
an agricultural policy for which the only objective is good nutrition.
There are insurxnountable problems in defining and dictating and ideal
levels of food production and consumption.
Section six will indicate how the goal of improved nutrition can
be considered as one of several, often opposing, goals of agricultural
policy . To this end, economists and nutritionists must give policy-
makers better estimates of the nutritional impacts of policy alternatives.
The nutritional effects of various policies could be estimated, with
some well-directed effort, by extending agricultural sector forecasting
models to include behavior by classes of consumers and by evaluating the
desirability of expected changes in nutrition for these classes,
THE NUTRITION PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES
Because of the food they eat, Americans do not lead as long or as
healthy lives as they might. This is the nutrition problem as a nutritionist
might define it. The statement is simple; the problem itself is complex.“5-
The nutrition problem in the United States encompasses two opposing
aspects. Some Americans (the poor minority) are malnourished because they
do not get enough food to eat. Some Americans (the affluent majority)
are malnourished because they eat too much of the wrong kinds of food.
At various times and by various nutritionists, both of these aspects
of the nutrition problem have been singled out for special consideration.
The 1969 White House Conference on Food, NutriEion, and Health focused
on hunger:
~~ecent repor’t~~ have shown that a large number of our
poor live in a deplorable state of malnutrition and many of
them are hungry .... The time has come to develop a national
nutrition and food distribution policy, a policy based on
human need and not predicated by agricultural subsidies.
The White House Conference on Food, Nutrition, and Health
... will meet to lay the foundation for such a national
nutrition policy. 51
Other studies stress the problem of obesity and poor nutrition among the
rich.
It should be apparent that Americans already eat too
much food .... It is inevitable that nutritional policy will
increasingly emphasize limitation of intake of certain foods
and food constituents and moderation of dietary habits. ~/
The contradictions inherent in the nutrition problems are obvious:
We cannot encourage a widespread increase in the food consumed lest the
4_/ Jean Mayer, IiWhiteHouse Conference on Food, Nutrition~ and Health>
1969,” Postgraduate Medicine, Vol. 46, No. 3, September 1969, reprinted in
J. Mayer, Human Nutrition, Charles Thomas mblisher, Springfield, lllinois,
1972, p. 639.
~/ D. Mark Hegsted, I!Nutrition in Perspective>” presented at the
Farm Foundation National Public Policy Conference, Burr Oak State Park,
Ohio, September 11-15, 1978, published in Increasing Understanding of
Public Problems and Policies, 1978, Farm Foundation, Oak Brook, Illinois,
1978, pp. 17-18.-6-
overfed majority eat more.;we cannot encourage a widespread decrease
in food consumed lest the hungry minority eat less. Neither part of the
problem is imaginary; neither group can be ignored. In the United States,
6/
the more common affliction is overeating. - Ignoring the nutrition problems
of the poor is wrong; it may also be politically unwise. In spite of
appearances to the contrarys perhaps the.affluent person isa and should be,
concerned about the condition of his cm her hungry neighbor.
The complexity of the nutrition problem is increased by the fact
that nutrition is a cumulative process$ not an event. A person’s health
and nutritional status at any given time period depends upon his nutrition
in all previous time periods. A poli.cymaker must consider not only the
immediate effects of a policy but also the effects on nutrition in future
periods.
Period-to-period fluctuations in nutritional status must be weighed
along with average nutrition levels. A policy which moves average nutrition
closer to ideal nutrition over time but which increases year-to-year
fluctuations around the average may be a nutritionally harmful policy.
I should also point out that, for the purposes of this paper, I am
making a distinction between the nutrition problem and the issue of food
purity or wholesomeness. Undeniably, this is an important problem.
However, here it is an unnecessary complication. If food purity is to
6y I!Obesity, the most widespread nutritional disorder in the
United States, ... currently ~~ffect~T about 30 percent of middle-aged
American males and 40 percent of the females.c’
M. Rupert Cutler and Syd Butler, Testimony before the NutritiQn Sub-
committee of the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, U.S.
Senate, February 22, 1978, releaaed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Washington, D.C., 1978, p. 15. Mr. Cutler is Assistant Secretary of Agri-
culture for Conservation Research and Education. Mr. Butler is Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for Food and Consumer Services.-7-
be improved by federal government action, much of the responsibility will
fall on the Food and Drug Administration , which enforces standards for
acceptable levels of chemicals and contaminants in food. USDA programs
(especially the inspection and gxading programs) do have an impact on
food purity. In the proposal for analysis of nutritional impact of
government programs, there is room for considering this impact, but this
paper will not focus on it.
THE “STATE OF THE ARTS” OF NUTRITION SCIENCE
Before going very far in our analysis of nutrition’s proper role
in the agricultural policymaking process, we have to take a closer look
at nutrition science itself. Does nutrition science provide a sufficiently
solid basis on which to build a nutrition policy? In particular, we
ask of nutrition science that it be able to label objectively any change
in food consumption as a good change, a bad change, or no substantive
change.
Nutrition science is modern, in many ways a fledgling
As Hegsted says,
7/ l~Nutrition is an inexact sci.ence.i’ - On
(for example, the dangers of cholesterol), there is a good
8/





about the ideal levels of nutrient intake must constra~.n, but needn’t
~/ Hegsted, ~-. &., p. 16.
~/ For a good example of this lack of scientific concurrence, see
Council for Agricultural Science and Technology, Dietary Goals for the
United States: A Commentary, Report No. 71, November 30, 1977. This
report takes exception to some of the findings of the Senate Select Committee
on Nutrition and Human Needs.-8-
paralyze, the policymaker who sincerely desires to improve the public
welfare.
There are 10 statements which I believe will find general acceptance
among nutritionists and which should be understood by policymakers interested
in improving nutrition:
(l.) A person’s health is affec~ed by his or her diet.
(2) Nutrients —those elements of food which affect health—can be
identified and measured.
(3) Nutrient concent of foods—the level of each nutrient which is
available from a food in the form in which the food leaves
the supermarket —can be measured.
(4) The level of nutrients actually derived from a food may be
different from the potential nutrition available because
of the.way the food is prepared and the amount of the food
which is discarded.
(5) The optimal level of nutrient intake—that level which pro-
vides the longest, healthiest life—can be approximately
determined for an individual.
(6) Optimal levels of nutrient intake will differ between in-
dividuals. The optimal level of nutrient intake for an
individual depends on, among ocher things, the individual’s
age, physical activity, current health, past diet, and other
demographic characteristics, such as race, physiological state
(infancy, pregnancy, etc.).
(7) For certain demographic groups (say, for example, school-
age children from low-income households), nutritional needs
are sufficiently similar for nutritionists to define a-9-
band of optimal intake
the group. If average
group is more than the
which applies to all members of
nutrient consumption for the
maximum or less than the minimum
of this band, such consumption can be said to be sub-
optimal.
(8) Current levels of nutrient intake can be and are
measured for demographic groups,
(9) The nutritional well-being of an individual or of a demo-
graphic group is not determined solely by the consumption
of a single nutrient; rather$ it depends upon the complete
diet . Therefore, any change in food consumption cannot
be judged as a good or bad change on the basis of the
change in intake of any single nutrient.
(10) For an individual or group, nutritional problems, i.e.,
intake above or below the “acceptable” band, can be
ranked in importance by nutrient.
Nutrition Affects Health
This is the most basic and most universally accepted of che 10
tenets. It is a fact comprehended by all animals; even in its most so-
phisticated expression, the fact is a part of informal folk wisdom and
not a scientific postulate. Yet, it is this fact that makes nutrition an
applied rather than a moot or esoteric science. Moreover, it is this
fact that motivates the policymaker.-1o-
Nutrients
In order to describe the relation between food and health more
scientifically or analytically% nutritionists kve identified certain
nutrients—e lements of food which affect health. To date, nutritionists
have isolated some 40 to 50 of these attributes. They may be grouped
as calories, protein, fats, carbohydrates minerals (ironj calcium, etc.),
vitamins (riboflavin, Vitamin C, etc,)$ and others (water$ fibers etc.).
These nutrients can be measured in grams or international units, for
example. To a large extent, the contribution of each nutrient in combatting
or fostering diseases can be identified. These contributions are the
subject of much current research in nutrition science. The relation-
ship between nutrients and health may never by fully comprehended; enough
is known, however, to provide a firm basis for policy action.
~utrient Content of Food
A given amount of any food in a particular form can be described
in terms of these nutrients. Evidence of this is as near as the closest
box of breakfast cereal. Thus, one food can be compared with another in
terms of these nutrients.
Nutrient. Intake
Unfortunately, the policymaker cannot be sure that the consumer
will actually ingest the entire amount of nutrients available. A boiled
carrot yields nutrients different from those of a raw carrot. A POiiCy-
maker cannot infer from the amount of food bought by a consumer the exact
I.evelof nutrients received by that consumer; it is nutrients actually.ingested that define nutrition. The policymaker, however, need mot
despair at this. The whole of nutrition science is not so precise
that an approximation of nutrient intake will not suffice. Enough is
. known about consumer habits that the nutrients available in a “normally”
prepared quantity of food will serve as a workable approximation of
the nutrient intake from such a food.
Ideal Levels of Nutrient Intake
For an individual, a nutritionist can prescribe an ideal diet—
a diet that will ensure the individual as long and as healthy a life as
possible. This is not a totally precise process. Different nutritionists
may prescribe slightly different diets for the same individual. Here
again, the failure of nutrition scientists to be in complete agreement
need not deter the policymaker; approximations would do.
Nutritional Differences Between Individuals
More troublesome is the fact that no two individuals are exactly
alike in their nutritional needs. One’s ideal diet will differ, sometimes
substantially, from another’s. There is not a single optimal American
diet . The individual’s ideal diet will depend on a number of factors,
the most important of which are age, sex, past nutrition and current state
of health, level of physical activity, physiological state, and climate.
The difference between individuals can be large. For example, a young
adult male lumberjack may require three times as many calories (4,600-12-
kilocalories per day) as an elderly housewife (1,550 kilocalories per
day).
Because of these differences, national average nutrient intake does
not adequately measure the current nutritional status of the country, nor
do changes in the average permit us to evaluate changes in society’s
nutrition. Suppose that for a society consisting only of a lumberjack
and an elderly housewife, we observe an average calorie intake of 3,000
kilocalories per day. If the lumberjack is getting 4,400 kilocalories
per day and the housewife 1,600 kilocalories per day, then calorie intake
in the society is very nearly optimal. If, on the other hand, the
3,000 kilocalories per day average represents a situation where both the
lumberjack and the housewife eat 3,000 kilocalories per day, ~here is a
major nutric.i.onal problem in the society. Just as average intake reveals
nothing about the extent of malnutrition, a change in the average (to 3,075,
for example) could signal an improvement (lumberjack from 4,400 to 4,600
and housewife from 1,600 to 1,550) or a deterioration (lumberjack steady
at 4,400, housewife from 1,600 to 1,750). ~’
Aggregating Individuals into Demographic Groui
Because nutritional needs vary so much between individuals, national
averages do not help either in identifying nucriti.onal problems or in
I_&/ Recommended nutrient requirements and allowances are usually for-
mulated to provide a guide in planning for the nutrient needs of the average
healthy individual or, more appropriately, of a particular population group.
Unless au individual meets the criterion of the “average” man, such die~ary
standards should not be used aa a yardstick for nutritional assessment without
making the necessary adjustments.
Conrado R. I?ascual,Carmen L. Intengen, Josefina Bulato-Jayme, Rodolfo
F. Florentine, and Leon G. Alejo, !lNutr~tio:~al Requirements : Dietary
Allowances and Requirements for Calories and Nutrients,’! in Food Consumption
and Planning, K. K. P. N. Rao (cd.), International Encyclopedia of Food
and Nutrition, Vol. 5, New York, 1976, pp. 139-221.-13-
indicating whether the situation is improving or deteriorating. Yet, it
would be absurd-for the government to try to monitor the diets of every
individual in order to perfect nutrition policy. However, there is a
middle road.
Itwe can identify While no two people are ~lnutritionally identical~
demographic groups in which all members of a group are very similar in
nutritional needs and nutritional status. Because the variance within
any group is relatively small, Che group can be treated (for policymaking
purposes) as a single individual , with the group averages representing the
real and ideal nutrition situations for that individual.
As pointed out inthe above section, nutritional needs differ with
age, sex~ activity, and physiological. state. The U.S. nutritional standards
are published for some 17 groups divided by sex and age with two special
categories for pregnant women (see Appendix A). The British standards
break the population up into 26 groups, making distinctions in some
age and sex groups between different levels of physical activity.
Within each of these groups, there may be reasonable homogeneity in
nutritional needs but quite a bit of variation among individuals in actual
diet , Diets may differ between individuals because of income differences,
differences in tastes and preferences, or because the individuals face
different sets of relative prices. In general, I believe that we can
safely disregard differences in relative prices in the United States
since such differences are small in comparison to the imprecision inherent
in this categorization process. If there are important differences
in relative prices, they are likely to show up in comparisons of rural-
to-urban prices. Differences in tastes and preferences are more significant
but almost impossible to categorize. The most important and most easily“l4-
quantifiable cause of differences in diet is income. Even broadly defined,
income class breakdowns greatly reduce the variances of nutrient intalce
within each “nutritional-need” group.
Given these differences, we may want co divide each nutritional-
need category into urban and rural subcategories wit-h three income classes
for each subcategory. Six subdivisions in each of the 26 nutrition groups
on the British list would give us 156 total groups. Within each group,
both nutritional needs and nutritional status would be sufficiently
homogeneous for the policymaker to defi,ne the extent of the nutrition
problem and to identify improvements in society’s nutrition. One hundred
fifty-six sounds like a lot of groups , and in fact this may be an unnecessarily
fine breakdown. By examining figures on requirements




The needs of a group’s members may not be so homogeneous that
nutritionists can define a single, exact optimal.amount of nutrient
intake. However, nutritionists can agree on an optimal band of nutrient
intake for each of these groups. It may be more realistic (i.e., it may
preclude a good deal.of picayune debate among nutritionists) to talk about
zones or bands of optimal nutrient intake rather than a single quantity.
If actual nutrient intake for a group moves toward (or away from) this optimal
band, the change would be an improvement (or a deterioration) in nutrition.
Movements within the band would signal no significant difference in
nutrient intake. (All of this assumes intake of ocher nutrients remaining
constant.)-15-
Measurement of Nutrient Intake .— .
The recommended daily allowances tell us the optimal nutrient intake
of each demographic group. In order to determine the extent of the nutrition
problem, we must know how far actual nutrition of these groups is from
ideal nutrition. We also need a surveillance sysrem to monitor changes
in nutritional status. The surveillance mechanism exists. ~~’
The U.S. Department of Agriculture conducts the nationwide Food Con-
sumption Survey every 10 years. (The latest published figures are for
1965.) Among other things, this report gives figures on actual nutrient
intake as a percent of recommended intake for 22 sex and age groups,
three income groups, and two geographical areas (see Appendix B). The
Department of Health, bducation , and Welfare has conducted a “lO-state
nutrition survey>” concentrating on nutrition among the poverty stricken
and has followed with a not-yet-published Healtih and Nutrition Examination
survey (HANES).
Nutrition Depends on t~e Total Diet_ ——-
Tt may seem trivial at this point to observe that a person’s (or a
group’s) nutritional status cannot be determined by examining the intake
of only one or two of the 40 or 50 nutrients. This observation is necessary
because it is often overlooked. Studies of nutrition in developing countries
commonly use calorie intake alone (or, more recently, calorie and protein
intake) as an index of a country’s nutrition problem. In developing
~/ For a good review of existing surveillance systems, see D. Mark
Hegsted, “Nutritional Surveillance in the USA,” in Nutritional Proble~
a Changing World, Dorothy !lollingsworth and Margaret Russell (eds.), Halsted
Press, New York, 1973, pp. 69-82. For a discussion of how to organize a sur.-
vei.llance system, see Emma Reh, “Food Consumption: Food Consumption Surveys-
Methods and Results,” in Rao (cd.), ~. cit., pp. 63-138.-16-
Collntries> this simplification may be warranted because helath problems
relating to other nutrients (such as blindness, rickets, or gum disease)
pale beside starvation (the lldisease~l rela~ed to calOrie or protein
deficiency).
In the United States, the simplification is not justified. No single
nutrition-related disease is of commanding importance. Different nutrition
problems compete for the policymalcer~s attention. Without careful thought
and specific intent, it would be a mistake to design a nutrition policy
around any one of these problem areas~ yet such tunnel vision focusing
on a single nutrient is fairly common among observers of the nutrition
problem in the United States. Recognition that competing forces exist
in nutrition is of vital importance to the policymaker. Whenever possible,
we wish to alleviate one problem without exacerbating any other.
This utopian solution is not always possible; at times we must choose
to favor one problem over another. In part, this favoritism involves a
political choice —one age-sex-income-geographic group must be favored
over another, and$ in part, the favoritism involves a nutritional choice—
attainment of optimal intake levels for one nutrient takes precedence over
attainment of optimal levels for another.
Ranking Nutrition Problems
on this point, nutritionists have not yet concentrated their research
efforts. For any given demographic subcategory, nutritionists should
be able (and, when they put Eheir minds to it, are able) to rank the nutritional
concerns in order of importance to health. “ We should be able to say,
12/ Langier suggests that, at least in poor countries, the importance
of a ~trient can be measured by the extent of its deficiency. Jose David
Langier, Economical and Nutritional Diets Usin? Scarce Resources, Michigan
State University, East Lansing, Michigan, 1969.-s.?-
for example, that for 20-34 year-old females in middle- and upper-income
groups the most important concern is iron intake; the second most im-
portant problem is calcium intake; the third, calories, etc. This would
allow policymaker’s to compare, within any group, an improvement in iron
intake with a deterioration in calorie intake and an improvement in iron
intake for one group with a deterioration of iron intake in another
group.
* * * ** * ** * $<** ** **
A farmer, speaking in a forum sponsored by the Farm l?oundation~ said:
I agree that nutrition should have a major policy role—an
increasing role. But the discussion this morning reaffirmed
my fear that we~re not ready. The evidence from research is
not ready to play a major role in decisions on food policy
in the near term. And I~m frightened that policy will go too
far without an adequate information base. We farmers get
very frustrated with the mixed, so-called facts, research, and
statistics that the nutrition and the medical professions use
to evaluate our product and our futures. ~/
I disagree with this view. ~/ Nutrition science
It does not provide exact and unassailable measures of
i.snot perfect.
nutritional status
on which to base and evaluate a nutrition policy. Nutrition science is
advanced enough to point policymakers in the right direction and to
identify certain clear and pressing problems.
g/ The tenets of nutrition
13/ William J. Richards, illmPlement~ng an Expanded Food and Nutrition
Polic~ A Farmer’s Point of View,” in Increasing Understanding of ~blic
Problems and Policies, Q. cit., p. 35.
14/ Joining me in thi~pinion are H. S. Olcott, in American Journal —
of Agricultural Economics, ~. c&.; Jean Mayer, in Hearings before the
Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs of the U.S. Senate, Part I,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1969; M. J. Ganzin,
J. Perisse, and P. Francois, !lNeed for Food and NutritiOn Policies$” in
Man, Food, and Nutrition, M, Rechcigl (cd.), CRC press, Cleveland) OhiO$
1973, pp. 275-286.
15/ Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, U.S. Senate,
Dieta3 Goals for the United States, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., 1977.-18-
science provide warnings and restrictions as well
We must keep in mind.
(1) that nutritional value of food purchased
as guideposts, however.
is not equal to
the nutritional value of food actually ingested,
(2) that nutritional needs differ between demographic




THE NUTRITION PROBLEM—AN ECONOMIST’S REDEFINITION
Looking back on the previous section on nutrition science, we see
that the word ‘~optimal” is used in a way quite different from the way
economists use the term. The “optimal level of nutrient intake” was that
level which insured an individual the longest and haalthl.est life possible.
Any movement away from this optimum, either by inca?e~sing or decreasing
nutrient intake, results in a shomter and less healthy life. A graph





X* Level of nutrient intake
I-19-
When nutrienti intake is below Che optimum level (x’b),an individual.
makes his life ‘longer and healehier by eating more of the nutrient. The
individual who overconsumes will improve his nutrition by eating less of
the nutrient.
If nutrition were the only reason for eating, then economists could
abstract from this argument to &he more comfortable ground of utility
analysis. We need simply to define the index of Iongevitiy and health as
a measure of utility. We then could speak of the problem in the more
familiar terms of utility optimization. However, the economist’s conception
of optimal utility differs. from the nutritionist’s concept of optimal
nutrition.
In economics, utility is optimized subject to some wealth constraint.
Utility is not derived from one commodity alone but from a wide range
of commodities, and because everyone has a finite amount of wealth with
which to purchase these commodities, no one can afford to consume all of
these commodf.ties at the satiation point (assuming one exists), where
the marginal utility equals zero and is declining. Utility will be op-
timized subject to the wealth constraint when the marginal utility, derived
from the conmmption of another unit of each commodity, is declining and
is equal to the commodity’s price. With concave utility functions and
prices greater than zero, we would find the economic optimum consumption
level to be less than the satiation point (x*) for every commodity.
There are circumstances under which the economic optimum is the
same as the nutritional optimum. In the above discussion, it was assumed
that the relation between longevity and nutrient intake was concave (the-20-
function shows decreasing marginal utiltty, or a further step toward optimal
nutrition improves health less than the last step) and that utility and
longevity were simply different words for the same thing so that the utility
function was also concave, but there is no law of nature requiring every
utility function to have a declining marginal utility, It may be that
every step closer to perfect nutrition brings an ever-increasing satis-
faction. This could occur under two conditions. The longevity function
could be convex —each step closer to perfect nutrition adds more years to
life Chan the last step. Or, an individual may value the increase in
expected longevity from 72 years to 73 years much more highly than the
increase in expected longevity from 22 to 23 years.
The relationship between utility and nutrient intake may be convex: ~
Convex utility functions -
















Concave utility functi,ona -
~iminishing marginal utilityIn this case, we would expect consumption of the nutrient to be at the
nutritional optimum, at point x* (if income allows, income divided by price
is greater than or equal to x*). As long as marginal utility is higher than
price, the individual will get more value, per additional unit purchased,
than the unit costs; therefore, he will consume the additional unit of the
good up to the nutritional optimum, x*, where marginal utility suddenly
becomes negative. However, the notion of a convex relation between utility
and nutrient intake seems unrealistic. Nutritionists favor the idea of
decreasing marginal longevity as nutrient intake approaches the optimum
level, and one might think that an additional year of life means more at
age 20 than at age 80.
In any event, this analysis only indicates that the economic optimum
nutrient intake will be less than or equal to the nutritional optimum.
How can we explain the behavior of overeaters, who consume at levels where
marginal utility
We eat, not
from food is not
from food. Food
(measured only by nutrition) is negative?
just for nutrition, but for pleasure. Utility derived
measured adequately by an index of nutrition derived
provides two sources of utility; we cannot optimize one
utility or the other separately; they must be optimized jointly. g/ If
pleasure derived from food is satiated at a much higher quantity than the
optimal nutrition level , we may find that total utility continues to
increase beyond the nutritionally optimal amount:
16/ For a discussion of demand for attributes of products, see V. E.
‘l!Measurement of product Attributes Recognized by Consumers>” in Seminar Smith,
on Consumer Preferences and Market Development for Farm Products, CAEA Report
5, 1960, pp. 1-27; and K. J. Lancaster, 11ANew Approach to Consumer Theory>”





Total utility Nutrient intake
is maximized
There is good reason for supposing that pleasure from some foods
peaks at a much higher quantity than nutrition derived from the foods.
Often, the foods we like are not the foods that are good for us. A recent










15 best-liked foods were as follows:
milk (9)
grilled steak (10)
eggs to order (1].)
























boiled pigs’ feet (11)
baked yellow squash (12)











1978, p. 23. According to Quoted in !Iplayboy after Hours>” Playboy, July
the same report, this survey will be reported in Paul-Dickson, CHOW, A
Cook’s Tour of Military Food, New American Library, 1978.-23-
high in fat and sugar, two of the most dangerously over-consumed nutrients
~/
in the United States,
Here again, under certain circumstances, the fact of joint utilities
derived from food does not imply, automatically, that the economic optimum
differs from the nutritional optimum. One set of circumstances under
which the nutritional optimum coincides with the economic optimum occurs
when total utility for food is convex and reaches a peak at the nutritional
optimum, x*. A second set of circumstances occurs when total utility for
food is concave but total marginal utility equals price at x*. A third,
a more interesting, possibility is the lexicographic utility ordering.
When lexicographers put together a dictionary, they order or rank
the words alphabetically. All words beginning with “A” come before all
words beginning with “B.’~ Within the “A’s,” “aardvark” comes before
“abacusj IIwhich comes before “accent.” This notion of alphabetical ranking
has been applied to the theory of utility maximization with interesting
results.
Conceivably, an individual might say, “For me, good nutrition is
of overriding concern. Only when I have optimized nutrition will I be
concerned with the pleasure component of food.” Such an individual would
put at the top of his ordering list a situation represented by the word
“aardvark, IIwhere both the nutrition compment
letter of the word) and the pleasure component
letter of the word) receive scores of “A.” If
(represented by the first
(represented by the second
the “aardvark” situation
was not possible, a situation represented by “avarice,” with optimal
Ill_/According to the Senate Select Committee, Dietary Goals, ~. Cit .-24-
nutrition and little pleasure, would be ranked above a situation represented
by “baboon, IIwith optimal pleasure and only slightly subopti~l nutrition.






a lexicographic utility ordering, we would
to be the same as the nutritional optimum,
income was high enough to purchase this amount,
If the lexicographic utility concept is realistic, it is so only up
19/ to that quantity of nutrient essential for survival. — It is in these
casesa where many people are struggling day to day for survival, that
emphasis on calorie and protein intake among the very poor becomes economi-
cally justigied. However, for people in the United States, the lexicographic
utility function probably has little real applicability.
From an economist’s standpoint, there is no ~ priori reason for
alarm (or government intervention) about the fact that some nutrients
are consumed at less tkkanthe optimal amount by some groups and that some
nutrients are overconsumed. To a nutritionist’s Warning, “People in the
United Statee do not eat as well as they should,” an economist might reply,
“SO what? People are maximizing their utility from food (subject to a
wealth constraint). The situation is as good as it can be, Why should
government intervene?”
Political economists and social philosophers have attempted to define
the proper role for government in a free market economy. In general, they
~/ According to Abraham MSS1OW, people have a “hierarchy of needs”
with physiological needs (food for eurvival) taking precedence over social
needs (food for pleasure). A. H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality, Harper
and Row, New York, 1970.-25-
say, when the conditions of perfect competition exist, the best strategy
for a society is simply to allow every member of that society the oppor-
tunity to pursue tiheirown selfish ends. The decision for government
intervention can never be justified by looking only at people’s choices,
leaping in whenever necessary to correct what the authorities believe are
people~s mistakes. Such an intervention should be advised only after an
examination of the circumstances in which these choices are made. DO the
conditions of perfect competition exist? If not, government intervention
may be justified.
Government intervention to improve nutrition can be justified on





When “externalities” exist, i.e., when people who are affected
by a decision have no way of influencing the decision maker>
the government may intervene to force the decision maker
to take into account these external effects.
When society wishes to help its ul~affl.uent members, the
government may act as the agent.
When private decisions are based on misinformation or on
imperfect information, the government may wish co inter-
vene in order to improve the quality of these decisions.
One of the assumptions of perfect competition is that prices will be
negotiated so that total marginal utility is balanced with total marginal
cost . All costs of production are borne by the seller, and all utility
will accrue to the buyer. If there are costs external to this negotiation-26-
process, the resulting price will be too low to cover the total cost
of producing Che last unit. If there are external benefits, the quantity
produced will be too low to meet the true demand for the good. When
externalities occur, economists often urge the government to intervene
in the negotiation, taking the part of the unrepresented individual or
group by imposing a tax equal to the amount of the external marginal cost
or a subsidy equal to the external marginal utility.
In situations where near-starvation is widespread, external benefits
from good nutrition include improved physical performance by laborers,
improved learning by students , and higher intelligence among babies. In
the Uni~ed States, starvation i.anot widespread and these externalities
20/
are insignificant. —
The most obvious externality of poor nutritional decisions is in
the area of health care. If every individual had to bear the total cost
of treatment for nutrition-related diseases, then each individual’s nu-
trition decisions would take these costs into proper consideration,
but , in Lhe United States, we dontt pay our own ways in health care.
We belong to health insurance plans of one sort or another (health maintenance
organizations, private, or government-sponsored insurance plans), under
which Creatment for any member of the group is paid for by the entire
group. The unhealthy take more out of the kitty than they contribute,
20/ Barry Popki.n, l~Economic Benefits from the Elimination of Hunger —
in America,” Public Policy, Winter 1972, pp. 133-153, estimates these
benefits for che United States in the late 1960’s. In the last 10 years,
there has been a vast improvement in nutrition among the poor in the United
States. The current figures are likely to be much lower than Popkin’s
estimate of $14 to $5(9billion.-27-
Thus, we might find that the healthy members of an insurance plan would
be willing to bribe the less healthy members to “eat better” in order to
save on insurance premiums.
This externality is addressed properly in a general forum; the problem
is not an adjunct of the nutrition problem. Rather, it is merely one
manifestation of an “insurance problem’’—in any insurance program, there
must be losers and winners. All par~icipancs are betting that they will
have a need for the insurance greater than the insured group’s average.
In discussions of the insurance dilemma, the nutrition problem should be
considered, but on
The existence of a
justify government
par with the problems of smoking, exercise, and tension.
health cost externality may (but does not necessarily)
action in the area of insurance; it certainly does not
necessarily justify intervention in the area of nutrition.
The second economic justification for government intervention in
nutrition decisions— income is distributed so badly in the United States
Chat some people are malnourished because they are too poor—does not grow
out of any direct contradiction of the explicit assumptions of perfect




on the contrary, it implies that income will be distributed
Harberge~lS llThree Basic Postulates for Applied Welfare
Economics” states:
When evaluating the net benefits or costs of a given
action .... the costs and benefits accruing to each member-28-
of the relevant group ... should normally be added without
regard to the individual(s) to whom they accrue. ~/
Obviously, guided by this postulate, society would refuse to undertake
any program to help the poor since any such program would have, in this
view, net benefits of zero atibest, i.e., with zero administrative costs.
If we.take one dollar from a rich man and give it to a poor man, society
is no better off since the poor man gains one dollar’s worth of utility
only at the expense of one dollar of the rich man’s utility.
Underlying this traditional “value-free” concept of society’s utility
is the primary assumption that the total utility of the society (W) is
equal. to the unweighed sum of the incomes of every hdividual of the society
W=:l for individuals i = 1 ... n
1=1 “i
This primary assumption contains three necessary secondary assumptions:
(1) The utility of all individuals in the society is valued
equally. Or, the appropriate functional form to describe
the relation between society~s utility and individuals’
utilities is the one given —an unweighed summation of
individuals’ utilities.
(2) Income is a valid proxy for utility.
(3) Utility of any individual is independent of any other
individual’s utility.
21/ Arnold Harberger, ItThreeBasic postulates fOr Applied Welfare
Econo~cs,” Journal of l?conoudcLiterature, Vol. 9, No. 3, September 1971,
p. 785.-29-
By altering any of these three
at the conclusion that society
help the poor.
assumptions, we can arrive fairly quickly
benefits from government programs which
At first glance, it may seem natural to compute society’s utility
simply by adding together the utilities of every individual. If, in
the two-person society described in the previous section, the lumberjack
had an income of $5 and the little old lady had an income of $15, then
the total utility of the society would be 20 units, but this means that
the society~s utility is the same whether income is distributed equally
($10 to each) or not ($20 to one, nothing to the other). This conclusion
seems “unreasonable’! to most people -it offends their sense of justice or
22/
morality. —
A common way of making the definition of society’s welfare more
“realistic” is to change the formula for computing society’s utility from
a given set of individual utilities. The two most commonly suggested
alternative forms for the total utility function are
(1) computing total utility as a product of individual
23/
utilities — and
22/ A. Bergson, !)onthe Concept of Social Welfare>” Quarterly
Journ~ of Economics, Vol. 68, 1954, pp. %233-2252.
g/
w= ; ~. for individuals i = 1 ... n.
~=-J ~
See discussion of “Bernoulli-Nash” product of utilities welfare
function in E. S. Phelps, trwageTaxation for Economic Justice~” Quarterly
Journal of Economic&, August 1973, pp. 331-354; reprinted in Economic
Justice, E. S. Phelps (cd.), Penguin, Baltimore, Maryland, 1973.-30-
(2) setting total utility equal to the utility of the poorest
2~/ individual in society.
If total production of the society is given, under either of these
methods of computation society’s welfare will be maximized when income
is distributed with perfect equality. Let us suppose that we want to
distribute $20 in a society of two people
welfare. If we measure society~s welfare
che first individual by the income of the
when we give $10 to each. If we measure
of the poorest individual, again we find
vidual gets $10.
(A more sophisticated form of these
in order to maximize the society’s
by multiplying the income of
second, welfare is maximized
society’s welfare by the income
welfare maximized when each indi-
computational formulas, though
a form less dogmatic in its policy implications, would make total output
(~ Ii) a function of the distribution of the Xi’s.3 depending, perhaps,
on the variance, skewness, and kurtosis of the income distribution.
This change takes into account the work-disincentive effects of progressive
taxes and welfare payments by which the income redistribution is affected.
If this computational form fairly represents the process society uses in
valuing its utility, then the government will wish to redistribute income
up to some point short of perfect equality.)
24/ W = Min Ii for individuals i.= 1 ... n. —.
See J. Rawls, ‘tDistributive Justice,” in Economic Justice, Phelps (cd.),
oQ” cit.; originally published as “Distributive Justice,” in Philosophy,
Poli~s, and Society, P. Laslet and W. G. Runcinan (eds.), B~kwell,
3rd series, 1967, and as “Distributive Justice: Some Addenda,” in
Natural Law Reform, Vol. 13, 1968. -.— —-31-
Although in the simple case above they both prescribe total income
equality as the way to maximize society’s welfare, the two alternative
formulas for computing total utility (product of individual utilities or
minimum of individual utilities) are not identical. When complete equality
is not a viable alternative, the two formulas may differ in their description
25/
of optimal income distribution. —
In fact, both formulas are special.cases of the more general functional
form,
where a. is a measure of the relative importance of each individual’s
1.
26/
utility to the society as a whole. —
g/ See Phelps, “Wage Taxation,” ~. ~.
2&/ J. M. Fleming, l#ACardinal conC@pt of we~fare~”
of Economics, Vol. 64, August 1952, pp. 366-384.
In the multiplicative computation, the weight varies






For the maximin formula, ai is 1 for all individuals at the very bottom
of the income scale and is O for all others:
ai
= 1, for all Ii ~ Ij for all j # i;
ai = O, for all Ii z Ij for any j # i.-32-
In general., if the society assigns heavier weights to the poor (ai > a
3
when Ii s I ), then society’s utility will be enhanced by government action
j
which robs rich Peter to pay poor Paul.
In the preceding discussion, the words “income” and “utility” were
used interchangeably. We may wish to make a distinction between these
two concepts. Pure-hearted policymakers will be disturbed by the arbitrary
way in which tk weights can be assigned to each person’s utility. Given
the general definition of welfare, W = 1 aili, any income distribution can
be demonstrated to be the best distribution, simply by assigning an appro-
priate set of weights.
On a more ri.gorou~ level, this weighting problem has disturbed
economists. Arrow has argued that there is no objective way to assign
27/ weights and preserve logical consistency in the welfare rankings. —
Littlets reply points out that the assignment of weighca need not be “dictatorial”-
reflecting the value system of only one individual--but instead can be based
on some more objective
28/ ll~onvent~~nTt or set Of rules. —
One such convention is the concept of diminishing marginal utility
of moneyf which relaxes the assumption that utility equals income. This
concept says that $100 brings a lot more happiness to a man with $1,000
than it does to a millionaire. According to this approach, it is acceptable
to measure society’s utility as the unweighed sum of individual utilities
(W= ~ Ui) aS long as we recognize that utility and income are not synonymous
but rather that utility is a steadily diminishing function of income:
~/ See K. J, Arrow, “Values and Collective Decision Making,” in
~conomic Justice, Phelps (cd.), op. cit., pp. 117-137; Social Choice and
Individual Values, Cowles Foundation Monograph No. 12, Yale University Press,
New Haven, Connecticut, 1951; Jerry S. Kelly, Arrow Impossibility Theorems,
Academic Press, New York, 1978.
28/ I. M. D. Little, IISocialchange and Individual Valu@5~” Journal ‘f
~olit~al Economy, Vol. 60, 1952, pp. 422-432; reprinted in Economic Justice,
Phelps (cd.), ~. C&., pp. 137-152.-33”
‘1
J.
By properly specifying the function f, we can arrive at exactly the same
conclusions as the weighted surns’of income approach, though by a more
29/
circuitous and, arguably~ more ‘*scientific” route; ‘-
BY relaxing the third assumption implicit in the original speci.fication—
that an individuals utility depends solely upon his own income and is
not influenced by the utility of others —we discover a qualitatively
different alternative justification for government programs to help the
poor. This is Harbergerqs “basic needs“ approach to cost-benefit analysis
of poverty alleviation programs. Again, we let total utility be the un-
.
weighted sum of individual utilities, but now we allow for existence of
externalities: An increase in the standard of living among some very poor
individuals in a society will not only make these individuals happier but
will also provide a sense of satisfaction (external u~ility) to other
members of society:
~/ Again, the choice of weights is subjective> but the choice




for some i and j Uj < u!
~
If individual j has a level of consumption below that level which is
necessary to provide certain basic requirements for human survival (repre-
sented by t]”), then other members of the society will get some satisfaction
from helping Mr. J to acquire these















poor can be justified
of income.
from any action which
to fulfillment of his basic
United States perhaps the most important,
government intervention in the area of nutrition
is the impertinence of another basic assumption of perfect competition.
The perfectly competitive ideal relies on the ability of individuals to
correctly determine and undertake those actione which best serve their self-
interest. When an individual is making decisions with imperfect infomnation
or misinformation about their consequences, we cannot expect these de-
cisions to be optimal from the society’s atanclpoint (since we cannot expect
them even to be optimal in the eyes of the individual who makes them).
When such an “information problem” exists, the government may be justified
in acting to correct this problem.Clearly, in the nu~ri.tiori area, we.have such an information problem.
Nobody has perfect information about the nutritional value of the food they
eat . BY improving people’s knowledge about nubrition, government acts
to improve the nutrition and Lhe utility of the society.
For Cwo reasons, I have gone into considerable detail to explain
the circumstances under which government intervention may be justified. “
First, those who ask, ~rwhatbusiness does the government have trYing to
regulate nutrition?” deserve a complete and, to the extent possible, a
logically consistent answer. Second, a good understanding of the reasons
for a government nutrition policy is necessary if we are to evaluate
alternative government programs for improving nutrici.on.
GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS TO IMPROVE NUTRITION—
A REVIEW OF’ PROPOSED REMEDIES
The economic literature on nutrition falls fairly neatly into the
two groups suggested by the above discu~sion:
(1) proposals for improving the nurriti.on of the poor and
(2) proposals for improving nutrition information.
30/ I would be remiss here if I failed to mention an extremely
impor~nt (perhaps devastating) caveat regarding the justification for
government intervention in the economic decision-making process. Under-
lying much of this discussion is the notion: Since the world of perfect
competition is a “perfect world, 11if the conditions of perfect competition
do not hold, the government should act, to the extent possible, to create
these conditions. The apparent logic of this notion is demolished by
the Theory of the Second Best , which demonstrates that piecemeal pursuit
of perfect competition will not usually lead to optimal allocation of
resources. See W. J. Baumol, “Informed Judgment, Rigorous Theory, and
Public Policy;’ Southern Economic Journal, October 1965, pp. 137-145.- 36 -.
Nutrition Among the Poor
Proposals. for improving the nutrition of the poor usually advocate
some variant of these four measures:
(a) income transfers (welfare paymenta),
(b) in-kind transfers (food distribution),
(c) coupons (food stamps), and
(d) price adjustments to encourage better nutrition among the poor.
As Har’berger points out, the way in which we justify government action
to help the poor will dictate our opinions about the relative propriety
31/ of these four measures. — Advocates of the diminishing marginal utility
of income concept will favor income transfers. The basic needs school
will favor the other three options although ~ as we shall see, under certain
circumstances, distribution of food stamps is a method of income transfer.
In the United States, many of the undernourished poor can afford
an adequate diet:
The “poor” in the United States, &.i.th some exceptions~
.... could be well nourished ... if they selected the prop~r
foods . They could buy the components of a nutrit.inally
adequate diet ... if palatability and variety were not factors
in their choices. But choosing unpalatable foods would be
irrational since they would not be eaten. ~~
31_/ Arnold Harberger, ItBasicNeeds versus Distributional Weights
in Social Cost-Benefit Analysis,qt unpublished background notes for a
seminar delivered at the University of Minnesota, February 1978. For
an earlier version of some of the same thoughts, see Arnold Harberger,
ll~nthe Use of Distribution Weights in Social Cost-Benefit Analysis>”
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 86, No. 2, Part 2, April 1978, pp.
S87-S120.
32/ Silvia Lane, IIpoverty, Food Selection, and Human Nutrition>”
in Ag~cultural Food Policy Review, ~.-.37-
Both the diminishing marginal utility school and the basic needs
school believe, that American society should assist their undernourished
poor. They disagree about the means of assistance, as mentioned above,
and about the goals of such assistance. The basic needs school is the
more parsimonious of the two. Suppose we are faced with a relatively poor
individual who could afford adequate nutrition but chooses to under-
,
consume certain necessary nutrients in order to buy an unnecessary luxury.
The believer in diminishing marginal utility of income would be inclined




him for nonnecessities, he will get more satisfaction out
than we rich folks would.” The basic needs disciple might
eat bread, not cake. The rest of us dontt get any satis-
faction by buying him luxuries. We don’t mind helping him reach a minimum
level of nutrition, but let’s stick to the baaics.” As Harberger observes,
the attitudes of most Americans (and of most economic analysts of the
nutrition problem) seem to be reflected in the basic needs approach,
33/
more so than in the diminishing marginal utility approach. —
Of course, a collection of economists’ suggestions about the nutrition
problem is a biased sample. Believers in the concept of diminishing
marginal utility of income would be unlikely to single out nutrition
special emphasis. To them, malnutrition is a symptom of the poverty
problem and, as such, would receive little attention in a discussion




remedies for the di.sease-unequa 1 income distribution. — The diminishing
marginal utility school will endorse any effort to help the poor (as long
as the increase in welfare exceeds Ehe administrative costs). This school
will prefer, however, direct income transfers, “ and some analysts
have suggested that the current food stamp program be replaced by increased
36/
cash payments to welfare recipients. —
34/ Several authors have studied the effects of increased income —
on nutrition. William Boehm ancll’aul. E. Nelson (“Food Expenditure Con-
sequences of Welfare Reform,” A&ricultural Food policy Review, ~. cit.,
pp. 45-50) investigate the effects of welfare reform on nu~tion i~he
United States. Also see Robert B. Reese, J. Gerald Feaster, and Garey
B. Perkins, Bonus Food Stamps and Cash Income Supplements: Their
Effectiveness in Expanding Demand for Food, Marketing Research Report
No. 1034, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washing-
ton, D.C., 1974.
Other studies have concentrated on third-world hunger. For example,
Alan Berg, The Nutrition Factor, Brookings Institution, Washington, Dec.,
1973. “There is increased understanding that more income per se does not
assure better nutrition.” Alan Berg and Robert Muscat, “Nutrition program
Planning: An Approach, “ in Nutrition, National Development ~,
Alan Berg, Nevin Scrimshaw, and David Call (eds.), MIT press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1973, pp. 247-274. Shlomo Reutlinger and Marcelo Selowsky,
Malnutrition and Poverty: Magnitude and Policy Options, World Bank Staff
Occasional Papers, No. 23, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1976.
gl “While concerned laymen who observe people with shabby housing
or too little to eat instinctively want to provide them with decent housing
and adequate food , economists instinctively want to provide them with
more cash income.” James Tobin, “On ‘Limiting the Domain of Inequality,”
Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 13, October 1970; reprinted in Economic
Justice, Phelps (cd.), ~. cit., p. 449.
3&/ See The Budget of~e United States Government—Fiscal Year 1979,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1979, p. 200.”-39”
This review of economic literature about nutrition programs to
help the poor ‘will concentrate on the three remaining program approaches:
food transfers, coupons, and price changes.
Giving food to the hungry has long been a popular American way of
dealing with the nutrition problem. Federal food distribution programs
have been of two types—general and targeted.
In the general food distribution programs, the government distrib-
uted food directly to the needy. The government maintained warehouses
of “surplus” food—farm commodities acquired by the government under various
price support programs. The “poor,” identified by local welfare agencies,
were entitled to pick up a certain amount of food, at no cost, from these
government warehouses. The primary goal of these programs was not to im-
prove nutrition but to dispose of surplus commodities. This became apparent
especially in the early 1970’s when food was scarce and government-held
food stocks dwindled. Largely because the general food distribution program
as administered did not do an adequate job of feeding the poor, the program
was phased out and replaced by the food stamp program.
Targeted food distribution programs are still in operation. In these
programs, the government donates food indirectly to certain groups, such as
school children or the elderly. The food is funneled through nonfederal
organizations or institutions—school districts, homes for the elderly,
etc. —which distribute the food to the poor in a ready-to-eat form. Unlike
the general food distribution programa, the targeted programs are primarily
nutrition programs rather than price support programs. Nutritional needs of
the target groups should be reflected in the kinds of food for distribution
.
purchased with P.L. 480, School Lunch, or Section 32 funds.-40-
Of course, a general food distribution program could be administered
with
This
nutrition rather than farm price support as its primary objective.
has been suggested: “I think in this country we ought to have sur-
pluses that are at least the right surpluses dictated by nutritional
N_/ considerations.” ‘i’here are some rather obvious drawbacks to a general
food distribution program.
Unlike targeted food distribution, the actual consumption of the
food would not be supervised---the general food distribution would be for
home consumption. Because of this, a general food distribution program
cannot be guaranteed to improve nutrition of the recipients. If the
quantity of a certain food given to a recipient is less than the quantity
the recipient would have consumed in the absence of any program, the food
donation is unlikely to increase significantly the total amount of the
food consumed by the recipient. The recipient’will substitute the free
food for food he would otherwise have bought. The effect will be exactly
the same as a cash grant. In order to be more cost-effective than income
transfers, a food distribution program must distribute nutritious food in
quantities larger than the amount consumed ‘tnormally,’ti.e., without any
program, by the target population.
Even if this condi~ion were met, we are not guaranteed an effective
nutrition program. Food is fungible; it can be converted into money or
other goods by selling or swapping it. Here again, the food distribution
may be little more than an indirect, and complicated, income transfer.
Because of transaction costs, we would expect a food distribution program
~/ Mayer, Hearings Before the Select Committee, ~. cit., p. 32.-41-
co have some additional effect on nutrition. Not all of the extra food
(quantities received over and above the normal consumption levels) will
be traded or sold for three reasons. First, it takes time and effort to
find a buyer or a trader with whom a recipient can reach a mutually satis-
factory bargain. Second, if the recipients are concentrated i-npackets
of poverty, e.g., sections of large cities, and if the recipient’s tastes
are similar ia any “pockett”
heavily on the black market,
locality, and consumption by
certain distributed foods will be offered
the prices of these foods will drop in the
the recipients of the items will increase.
Third, even if all the distributed food were converted into income, the
effects would be the same as an income transfer—some of the additional
income would be spent for necessary and nutritious foods.
Insofar as food distribution is an income supplement, either by
substituting for existing consumption and freeing up the income previ.oualy
spent for the distributed foods or by providing a fungible asset which
can be converted into money, food distribution in the United States may
harm nutrition as well as improve it. If, among the poor, the marginal
propensity to consume nonnutritious food (or antinutritious food) is
greater than zero (as it undoubtedly is), an increase in income of the





drinks, snack foods, starches, etc.). In other words,
normally overconsume any nutrients, income supplements




raise their market prices and discourage consumption of these
foods by nonrecipients.-42-
A general government food distribution program may also have serious
effects on the conunercial food distribution system. Even if the government
bought the food on the wholesale market in the final packaged form, the
retail outlets would be bypassed. A substantial portion of &he business
of grocers in the poverty areas would be usurped by the government. As
grocers in a poverty pocket find the demand for nutritious food dwindling
to almost nothing, all local demand now being supplied by the government,
we should expect a period of furious price cutting for nonnutritious foods
as these grocers struggle to increase the volume of sales in order to pay
the rents and, as the prices of Coke and popcorn go down, local consumption
of these harmful foods by the food recipi.encs will increase.
Finally, in our critique of a general food distribution program,
we should note its high operating costs. To distribute food, the government
must rent warehouse apace and hire stockers, checkers, and managers-all this
on top of the acquisition costs, transportation costs, and storage costs.
By distributing food stamps or coupons to the poor, we may avoid
these last two difficulties (high costs and harm to existing distributors).
Under a food stamp program, the food will still be distributed in existing
commercial marketing channels. Food stamp programs may be of several
different types. The stamps may be redeemable for any food or for certain
types of food only. The stamps may be given to recipients, or the re-
cipients may be required to purchase the stamps.
If the recipient population consumes less than the optimal level of
all, or nearly all foods , stamps should be redeemable for all foods. If,
on the other hand, the recipients are overconsuming certain foods, the
food stamps should not be redeemable for these foods. Among the poor“43”
in the United States some foods are luxuries; increasing consumption of
these foods will harm, not help, nutrition.
A program of food stamps only for selected
to operate than the general food stamp program.
clerks would be required to spend more time and
purchases and would expect to be compensated by
foods would be more costly
Grocers and checkout
effort validating food stamp
the government for this
additional time and effort. On paper, ac least, a selective food stamp
program is not impracticable. The WIC (Women, Infants, and Children)
Program is an example of a workable selective food coupon program.
Food stamps, whether for all food or for selected foods, can be
given away or can be sold at less than the face value to qualified recipients.
If food stamps are given away, they may have the same effects as an income
transfer because of substitution and fungibility, as discussed in the case
of food distribution. By requiring the purchase of food stamps, we can
guarantee that the expenditure by government will. result in a higher
consumption of nutritious food than an equal expenditure for income transfer.
Until recently, the federal food stamp program had a purchase requirement,
but allowed purchases of food stamps in one of four sizee only-=-one quarter,
one half, three quarters, or all of the maximum food stamp allotment.
The result is a “saw-toothed” budget line ~ with effects which may be
38/ rarely different from tk. effects of an income transfer. — A recent decision
eliminated the purchase requirement for food stamps. (See Appendix C for
a more complete discussion of alternative food scamp programs.)
38/ W, K. Bryant, I!TheFood Stamp’s Variable Purchase Option: The
Case ~~ the Saw-Toothed Budget Line,tsunpublished paper8 University of
Minnesota, 1972.-44-
I.nspite of the theoretical. reservations we may have concerning
food stamps, thi empirical evidence indicates that food stamps are effective
in improving nutrition. For every dollar of food stamps distributed (under
the saw-toothed purchase requirement system), food expenditures increase
by 85 to 95 cents. The food stamp program does improve nutrition. “
Nevertheless, there is no empirical evidence that a food stamp
dollar expenditure is nutritionally preferable to a dollar of income
transfer, and there are higher costs of administering a food stamp program
separate from the general government income subsidy program. There is
the additional cost of printing the food stamps and paying grocers for their
redemption. There is the cost of the additional bureaucracy for administering
the program. It is for these reasons that Ehe Carter Administration and
many other observers have advocated the.elimination of the food stamp
program and an expansion of income supplement programs.
Peter Timmer has suggested that malnutrition among &he poor can
be lessened by government
relative to other prices.
price policy on nutrition
policies which lower the prices for some foods
l&Q / — Timmer investigated the effects of food
in Indonesia. He concluded that nutrition would
be improved by price policies which raised the price of rice relative to
the prices of maize and cassava. The effectiveness of such a policy depends
upon the production and consumption situation in a country. In Indonesia,
39/ See Benjamin Sexauer, !lFoodPrograms and Nutritional Intake:
What fiidence?” in Agricultural Food Policy Review, o~. cit., pp. 39-44;
Maurice MacDonald, Food Stamps and Income Maintenance, A~emj.c Press,
New York, 1977. The newspaper recently carried a report on a Field Foundation
report. I\Federal food stamp, school lunch; and related Programs ‘have ended
the national shame of poverty conditions so gross they horrified the public
when the issue was publicized in the late 1960ts,’ the Field Foundation said.”
Lee Byrd (AP reporter), IiEffort to Ease Hunger in U.S. iS Huge Success> Study
Finds,’f The Minneapolis Tribune, my 1, 1979, p. 6c.
40/ Peter Timmer, llTheImpact of price Policy on Protein Calorie Intzd=~” —
unpublished paper delivered at the University of Minnesota, April 1978.-45-
rice is eaten mostly by upper- and middle-income groups. The poor eat
maize and cassava. Furthermore, many of the poor are employed in the pro-
duction of rice. Finally, calorie deficiency is so widespread that it can
be regarded as the premier nutrition problem; nearly any increase in food
intake by the poor can be regarded as an improvement in nutrition; nutrition
of the nonpoor and intake of other nutrients are minor problems when compared
to calorie deficiency. Increasing rice prices and holding prices of
cassava and maize constant should increase the real incomes of the rice-
producing poor and, consequently, improve their nutrition.
These conditions of production and consumption may be fairly common
in developing countries. They do not pertain to the United States. The
malnourished poor are not mostly food producers. Only 4.4 percent of food
41/
stamp recipients live in “rural areas.” — There is no clear distinction
between foods eaten by the rich and foods eaten by the poor. To the extent
that certain foods can be identified as being more heavily consumed by the
poor, these foods are likely to be contributing nutrients which already
are overconsumed by the poor. The foods eaten most predominantly by the
poor will have low income elaaticitiea of demand. A list of foods with
income elasticities less than 0.1 includes beans, lard, margarine, sweet
potatoes, rice, cornmeal, etc. A policy to encourage consumption of
these foods would not necessarily improve nutrition of the poor. Unlike
the Indonesian poor, the poor in the United States are sufficiently well-fed
~/ Thomas Carlin and Linda M. Ghelfi., “National versus State-Local
Eligibility Standards,” in Agricultural Food Policy Review, ~. cit.,
pp. 72-78.-46-
so that increased caloric intake is not their sole, or even their primary,
nutritional concern. If the poor in the United States eat more of any
kind of food, their nutrition will not necessarily be improved. The major
nutritional concern of the poor in the United States is the variety of food
consumed as much or more than the quantity of food consumed. The cir-





of the foods poor
Indonesia do not exist in the United States.
the Timmer approach would be to lower the relative prices
people should eat. This can be accomplished only by
shifting the supply curves of these foods down and to the right. Such
















market inefficiencies and barriers to free trade.
the United States imports, domestic prices can be
lowered quickly and clearly by reductng or elimi~ating import restrictions,
but the United States is not a net importer of most foods. The few
candidates for freer trade that spring to mind are beef, sugar, dairy products,
and fresh fruits and vegetables. The first two of these items are of
questionable nutritional significance. There is a general feeling among
nutritionists that consumption of red meaks and sugar, even among the“47”
poor, is too high in the United States. If this is the case, there is no
nutritional basis for relaxing import restrictions, lowering domestic prices,
and increasing consumption of these items.
Increased consumption of nonfat dry milk and (probably) cheese, would
improve nutrition among the American poor. Imports of these items are
restricted in order to protect and make workable the U.S. dairy price support
program under which the government agrees to buy butter, cheese, and NFDM
fat dry milk) at floor prices. At the present, any relaxation of import
restrictions would have to be tied to a decrease in these floor prices in
(non-
order to have any significant impact on prices, but the dairy price support
program acts to support prices and ensure an adequate domestic supply of
fresh milk as well aa NFDM and cheese. Any serious decline in the price
for milk paid to farmers could result in seasonal or local shortages in the
supply of fresh milk. ‘Thus, the improvement in nutrition due to cheaper
NFDM and cheese prices might be offset by higher prices and lower consumption
of fluid milk.
Fresh fruits and vegetable are clearly foods which the poor should
consume in greater quantities. Restrictions on imports of fresh fruits and
vegetables, especially from Mexicoa result in higher prices and lower
quantities consumed of these produces. The results of relaxing import
restrictions and lowering prices would be an increase in quantity consumed,
an increase in quantity imported, and a decrease in quantity produced
domestically. Protectionists, those who favor restrictions to international
trade, long have pointed to the last of these effects in support of their-48-
arguments. There is a “strategic” need for domestic production capability,
the protectionists say; we cannot rely on the vicissitudes of international
relations and third-world politics for meeting our domestic needs. From
a nutritionist’s standpoint, these arguments cannot be ignored, Good
nutrition is a long-range project. If we increase consumption of fresh
vegetables this year, only to see next year a vegetable embargo and a
drastic cut in vegetable consumption, we will not necessarily be improving
nutrition. Increasing export restrictions would lower the quantity exported,
lower the domestic price, and increase quantity consumed domestically. An
interesting example of increased export restrictions, and one related to
domestic agricultural policy, is the raising of support prices to above
the world price levels. Assume that the current price is set at the world
price level P. Current domestic production is Qws, current domestic













If the governmen~ ra~se~ the support price to P domestic production will
~’
increase to Qgs:
Quantity demanded on the market will decline to Qgd,
but the government will buy quantity
domestically to the poor.
One strong nutritional argument
Q =Q ~q fis
- Qgd, which can be distributed
against export restrictions is the
plight Qf the hungry outside the United States. Increased export re-
strictions, especially on those products (food and feed grains) in which
the United States has a significant amount of the world’s trade may raise
world prices, lower quantities consumed outside the United States, and
generally have a deleterious effect on world-wide nutrition.




from P* to Pp,
the compensatory payment to farmers producing these foods.
payment is a per-unit payment to producers above. the
A compensatory payment of Amount C raises prices to producers
* to P=, and ra lowers prices to consumers from P ises quantity
produced and consumed from Q* to Qc.
PI s-50-
Species of the compensatory payment
payments” for primary commodities.
First, if the commodity is exported
genus exist in the form of “deficiency
Two difficulties present themselves.
and if the price facing domestic
consumers is the world price, an increase in the compensatory payment
would subsidize only foreign consumption—domestic nutrition would be
42/
unaffected. — Second, compensatory payments require increased government
spending, which, in turns may lead to higher taxes, inflation, or both.
The nutritional effects of these requirements may offset partially




of lowering prices and encouraging consumption of nu-
to subsidize production of these foods by lowering the
into the production process. The simplest and most obvious
PL..-.-.X -------- --m
Qd Q* Qc
Price received by farmers increases from P* to Pp. Price paid domestically
remains at the world price Pc = P*. Quantity produced and quantity ex-
ported increase by an equal amount, Qc - Q*, and quantity consumed domestically
remains at Qd.-51-
way of subsidizing purchases of inputs is by means of a tax write-off or
coupons with the purchase of inputs redeemable by certified producers for
cash from the government. It would also be possible to subsidize the
production and consumption of animal products (meat, dairy, eggs, etc.)
by lowering the price of the feed input, i.e.~ by lowering domestic prices
of feed grains.
The government could also encourage production and consumption of
nutritious food by sponsoring research which results in cheaper production
costs for nutritious food. This research should concentrate either on
ways of producing more nutritious food as cheaply (or of producing equally
nutritious food more cheaply) or on ways of increasing or maintaining nu-
tritional value of foods in processing. Government research into both of
these areas has received considerable attention and criticism.
4~/
A final way, oft mentioned in the literature propounding nutrition
policy, of lowering prices of nutritious foods is to discourage “unnecessary
processing, unnecessary sales promotion, proliferation of products, and
44/
restrictive trade practices. — Processing, advertising, and proliferation
of products are “unnecessary!’ only when the consumer is tricked
into paying for them. The solution to these difficulties is improved
consumer information (discussed in the next section).
~/ See Jim Hightower, Hard Tomatoes, Hard ‘l!imes,, Schenkman Publishing,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1973; and ItReport of Panels on Traditional
Foods and New Foods to the White House Conference on Food Nutrition and
Health,” published in The White House Conference on Food Nutrition and Health:
Final Report, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1969,
pp. 101-128.
g/ llc~ents of Consumer Task Force,” White House Conference%-52-
On the issue of restrictive trade practices, the government could
more actively prosecute those restrictive trade practices it already opposes
or less actively support restrictive trade practices it currently succors.
Elimination of monopoly profits co middlemen would improve nutrition
and bolster farm income at the same time. However, there is some question
about whether such monopoly profits exist. A study by tiheNational Commission
on Food Marketing (NCFM) in the mid-1960’s reported profits of middlemen
for 21 different food items. In only three cases (cheese, canned corn,
and breakfast cereals) did total middlemen profits exceed 6 percent of the
45/
retail price. — On the other hand, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
reporting to the “NCFM, found, ‘lSince the early 1950’s, the profits of food
manufacturers have generally increased .... Firms selling in highly concen-
trated markets earned substantially higher profits than firms selling in
46/
less concentrated markets.” — Perhaps nutrition could be improved by
a stricter antimonopoly policy, but this policy falls outside the scope
of this paper, which is ~ricultural policies to improve nutrition.
Some critics claim that there are current agricultural programs
which encourage l~restrictive trade practices.” Usually singled out for
attention are market orders , cooperatives, and supply restrictions.
45/ National Commission on Food Marketing, Cost Components of
l?arm-~tail Price Spreads for Foods, Technical Study No. 9, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1966.
46/ National Commission on Food Marketing, The Structure of Food
Manuf=turin&, Technical Study No. 8, prepared by the Staff of the Federal
Trade Commission, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1966.-53-
Under the market order programs for milk and some fruits and vegetables,
classified pricing structures may be instituted. A classified pricing
system sets different prices for a commodity according to its use. Higher
prices are charged to users who convert the raw farm commodity into a
consumer good with a relatively low demand elasticity. Lower prices are
charged when the final form of the commodity has an elastic demand curve.
Classified pricing results in higher prices for fluid milk products and
for fresh fruits and vegetables. For this reason, market order programs
have been attacked as detrimental to nutrition. The White House Conference
on Food, Nutrition, and Health recommends> llweurge the removal of ar-
47/
tificial barriers of all kinds in the pricing and marketing of milk.” —
Certain members of the panel were more specific:
We recomnend elimination ... of unnecessary premium
prices paid by consumers to dairy farmers in order to make
milk more economical and thereby encourage its consumption
..’.especially among the poor. ... F deral millcorders are ... being
487 used against the public interest. ——
The evidence is not compelling that market orders harm nutrition. By
reducing Che uncertainty about farm prices, the program may encourage
the adoption of new, more economical production techniques and may,
therefore,
49/
result in lower long-term prices. — By dampening the seasonal
price fluctuations which would occur in a free market, market orders may
actually improve nutrition by encouraging steady consumption throughout
+&/ ItReportof panel on Traditional Foods> IIWhite House Conference,
q. cit., p. 105.
~/ Mary Morris and Charlotte Roderick, “Supplement to Report of Panel
on Traditional Foods,l!white House Conference, o&. ~., P. 109.
4~/ See William M. Capron (cd.), Technological Change in Regulated
Industries, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1971.-54-
the year instead of a feast-or-famine consumption pattern. Finally, it
should be noted that the classified pricing system may provide a unique
opportunity for changing relative prices to improve nutrition. Prices
for milk used in nutritionally desirable products (fluid milk) could be
lowered to encourage consumption. Farm prices and milk production could
be maintained at current levels by raising the price charged for milk
used in nonnutritious products (ice cream). The extent to which this
strategy would work will depend on relative demand elasticities for the
different products.
The USDA fosters the growth of cooperatives by providing information
about the best ways to organize and operate a farm cooperative and the
advantages of cooperative membership. The USDA is also responsible,
under Section 2 of the Capper-Volstead Acts for identifying and prohibiting
monopoly practices (undue price enhancement) by cooperatives. If any
unduly enhanced prices received by co-ops are passed on co the co-op
members and if no supply restrictions are put on farm production of coop
members , the monopoly prices will be short-lived as the supply of the commodity
increasea and a competitive equilibrium is restored. “ Monopoly power
among co-ops will raise food prices and adversely affect nutrition only if
the co-ops do not distribute monopoly profits to their member-owners or
if co-ops can impose supply restrictions on their members. on the first
!55/ Peter Helmberger, “Cooperative Enterprise as a Structural
Dimension of Farm Markets,” Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 44, AugusE 1964,
pp. 603-617, For a more complete discussion of co-ops and competition,
see Bruce Marion (cd.), Agricultural Cooperatives and the Public Interest,
-Proceedings of a Workshop in St. Louis, Missouri, June 1977, North Central
Regional Research Publication 256, Madison, Wisconsin, 1978.-55-
point, farmer-members do not receive the total dollars received by a co-op.
Deductions are made for administrative and marketing costs for advertising
and promotion, for political contributions, for CO-OP expansion, and toward
a revolving fund which will pay out in the future money received today.
In most cases, these expenditures are justified—they are not indications
of a monopoly power existing solely for the benefit of the management
bureaucracy. On the second point, co-ops cannot enter into any supply-
51/
restricting agreement with their members without violating antitrust laws. —
Supply restrictions may be imposed and administered by the federal
government. In the past, government-sponsored supply control programs
have included acreage allotments (limiting the number of acres a farmer
can plant in a certain crop), marketing quotas (limiting the quantity of
a commodity which a farmer can sell each year), and soil conservation or
set-aside programs (requiring farmers to take a number of acrea out of
production). These programs result in
quantities produced and consumed. The
among the domestic poor by
on those commodities which
the present time, however,
in agricultural policy and
on nutrition.
We have looked at six
prices for foods which the
reducing or
higher prices for food and lower
government could improve nutrition
eliminating supply restrictions
are presently underconsumed by the poor. At
supply restrictions are not an important element
do not have a significant detrimental impact
.
methods by which the government could reduce
poor should eat in greater quantities. Because
——
51_/ Martin A. Abrahamson, Cooperative Business Enterprise, McGraw-
Hill Book Co., New York, 1976, p. 212.‘-56-
demand for food is very inelastic, however, a price change will have to be
very large in order to have a large impact on nutrition. For example, most
age-sex groups do not get enough calcium to meet recommended daily requirem-
ents . If we wish to lower the price of fresh milk in order to increase
calcium consumption by 15 percent, we will have to lower the price of milk
by 43 percent (given a price elasticity of -.345545). “ If the current
price per gallon is $1.75, we would have to lower the price to 99 cents
per gallon in order to achieve our nutrition target.
The above discussion has singled out four ways of improving the
nutrition of the poor: income transfers, food distribution, food coupons,
and relative price changes. A national nutrition policy which focuses
only on nutrition of the domestic poor may end up doing more harm than good.
The diets of the poor in the United States are sufficient in calories.
Many of the U.S. poor eat too much— 20 percent of the poor children are
53/ obese, according to Mayer. — The principal. nutrition problem among
the poor in the United States is deficiency in certain vitamins and minerals.
It is difficult to improve this situation among the poor without exacerbating
nutritional problems of other groups. A policy which encouraged production
and domestic consumption only of foods needed by the U.S. poor, for example,
liver for iron and milk for calcium, would result in less food (wheat,
soybeans, etc.) available for the world’s poor , whose principal nutrition
problem is calorie and protein deficiency. A policy which encouraged
~/ Demand elasticity for milk as estimated by P. S. George and G. A.
King, Consumer Demand for Food Commodities with Projections for 1980,
Giannini Foundation Monograph No. 26, California, 1971.
53/ Mayer, Hearings Before the Select Committee, ~. ~. —-57-
production of all food would result in lower prices and increased consumption
by the rich whose principal nutrition problem is obesity. Nutritional
programs to help the poor may have significant harmful effects on the
nutrition of nontarget groups.
Information
The second category of nutritional programs includes those which
attack the information problem. Imperfect information can be of two
types —misinformation or lack of information. Misinformation (the
consumer believes that a food is nutritional when it is, in fact, harmful,
or vice versa) can be corrected (a) by eliminating sources of misinformation
or (b) by providing the consumer with correct information. The Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) protects the public from false and misleading
advertising. Recently, the FTC haa been considering a proposal to eliminate
or restrain advertising directed at children by food manufacturers (especially
for breakfast cereals, candy, and snacks). Such advertising inflates
demand for nonnutritious foods (especially those high in sugar) by assuring
children that these foods are “good.”
The alternative to prohibiting this type of advertising is to launch
a program of “corrective” advertising. The government could purchase
air time and run advertisements informing children that these sugary foods
are not good for them. A study comparing these two alternatives indicates
that prohibition of advertising is less effective than corrective advertising
in lowering consumption. “
54/ James L. Hamilton, “The Demand for Cigarettes: Advertising,
the H~lth Scare, and the Cigarette Advertising Ban,” Review of Economics
and Statistics, Vol. 54, No. 4, November 1972, pp. 401-409.-58-
An important cause of the nutrition problem in the United States
is the lack of understanding about good nutrition. People simply do not
know what foods are good for them and what foods are harmful. Four
methods have been proposed for getting more nutrition information to
people:
(a) mass media advertising, “
(b) classroom education and extension, “
55/ Richard K. Manoff, llThe~ss Nedia Contribution to Intervention
ProgrZs,” in Nutrition, National Development, ~ and Plannin , Berg, et al.
(eda.), ~. cit., pp. 217-222; Toshio Oiso, “Nutrition in National Devel-
opment : The_%panese Experience, f!in Nutrition, National DeveloPment~
and Planning, Berg, et al. (eds.), q. cit., pp. 366-369; “Mass Communications
in Nutrition Improvement,” PAG Bulletin~Mrch 1976, Protein-Calorie Ad-
visory Group, United Nations , articles by Joseph Ascroft, Andreas Fuglesang,
Erskine Childers, and Maritta Kock-Weser; Joanna Dwyer and Jean Mayer, “Be-
yond Economics and Nutrition: The Complex Basis of Food Policy,” in Food:
Politics, Economics, Nutrition, and Research, Philip Abelson (cd.), —
American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, D.C.,
1975, pp. 74-78; Report of the Panel on Popular Education to the White
House Conference, ~. cit., pp. 179-196; James E. Austin, “Attacking the
Malnutrition Problem,”~ Food, Man, and SocietY, Dwain N. Walcher, Norman
Kretchmer, and Henry Barnett (eds.), Plenum Press, New York, 1976, pp. 82-
99.
56/ Reports of Panels on Elementary and High School Education,
Advan~d Education, and Community Teaching, White House Conference, ~.
cit., pp. 147-178; Dwyer and Mayer, ~. cit.; Council for Agricultural
=ence and Technology, Significant Issu~in Nutrition, Report No. 57,
July 1976, p. 4; Berg, The Nutrition Factor, ~. cit., pp. 75-87;
Austin, llAttacking the ~lnutrition problem,” ~.—~. ; John A. Schnittker$
Testimony in Hearings Before the Select Committee on Nutrition and Human
Needs, U.S. Senate, Part 6, March 27, 1969, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., 1969, p. 2100; Ellen Haas, “Implementing an Expanded
Food and Nutrition Policy: A Consumer View,” in Farm Foundation, Increasing
Understanding of Public Problems and Policies, ~. cit., pp. 28-29;
Hans D. Cremer, ~!TeachingAspects, Education, and T=ning in Nutrition>”
in Food, Man, and SocietY, Walcher, et al. (eds.), ~. ~., pp. 186-204.- 59 -
(c) in-store leaflets and signs, 2’ and
(d) labelling. “
The first three methods are intended to teach people what nutrients
are and how much of each nutrient should be consumed. The :finalmethod
is designed to inform consumers how much of each nutrient is contained
in different foods.
Unfortunately, there is reason to doubt the efficacy of these
methods in improving nutrition. More information leads to better decisions
only if the information is presented in a usable way. Psychological
studies have shown that more information often leads to more confusion
and worse decisions:
There appear to be definite limits to the amount of
information which can be accommodated and effectively pro-
cessed during a limited time span by consumers in arriving
at purchase decisions. ... There is considerable evidence
to indicate that providing additional information can and
sometimes does increase uncertainty .... Increases in the amount
of information to contend with may eventuate in a decrement in
the quality of decision-maker performance. 59_/
57/ Austin, ItAttacking the Malnutrition Problem,” ~. ~. ; —
Haas, ~. &.; James E. Austin, !!Marketing Nutrition> “ in Ag. World,
vol. 3, No. 10, December 19’77,p. 1; Marketing Group, AGS, and Education,
Training,and Research Group, ESN of the l?AO,l~FoodMrketing Programs for
Improving Human Nutrition,” presented at 23rd PAG meeting, June 1975,
published in E’AGBulletin, Vol. V, No. 4, December 1975, pp. 2-9; Dwyer and
Mayer, ~. cit.; Report of Panel on Community Teaching, White House
Conference,~. cit.; M. Rupert Cutler, Remarks to National Institute
of Health Conference, Bethesda, Maryland, June 1978, released by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C., 1978.
58/ Dwyer and Mayer, ~. ~.; Paul A. Lachance, “A Commentary —
on the New F.D.A. Nutrition Labelling Regulations,” in Nutrition Today~ VO1. 8>
No. 1, January-February 1973, pp. 18-22; Schni.ttker, ~. c&.; Panel on
Community Teaching, White House Conferencet ~. cit.; Haas, ~. ~.
59/ Jacob Jacoby, llInformtion Load and De~ion Quality: Some
Conte~ed Issues,“ Journal of Marketing Research, November 1977, pp. 569-
573.-60-
Because of this information overload, simply providing consumers with
a lot of numbers will not significantly improve nutritional decisions.
If it is to be effective, the information must be “condensed” into a form
in which the consumer can comprehend and use it. It has been suggested,
in the case of therapeutic drugs, that information about their efficacy
and safety can be communicated to consumers by banning the sale of dangerous
60/
or ineffective drugs. — If banning is an effective way of communicating
information, may we not also use the price mechanism to inform consumers
61/ about the nutritional impacts of foods? — The government could
announce to consumers, ttwewant to help you make better decisions about
the food you eat. TO this end, we are instituting a program which will
make nutritious foods more attractive to you and nonnutritious foods
less attractive. We will do this by raising the prices of harmful foods
and lowering the prices of nutritious foods.~’ Such an announcement would
have.the effect of changing the tastes and preferences of consumers and
shifting their demand curves for foods. Currently existing demand
elasticities would not accurately measure the likely response of consumers
to these price changes. The effective demand elasticities would be
higher. Consumers would regard the initial price changes as informative and
would react more positively than usual to price decreases and more nega-
tively to price increases.
60/ See Victor Goldberg, “The Economics of Product Safety and —
Imperfect Information,” and Walter Oi.,“The Economics of Product Safety
and Imperfect Information: A Rejoinder,” in Bell Journal of Economics
and Management Science, Vol. 5, No. 2, Autumn 1974, pp. 683-695.
61/ !!prices and wages represent an essential form of economic ‘ree
—
speech; money is just another form of information.” Walter Wri,ston,
llRePressing Economic News> “ Wall Street Journal, l.lay 4, 1979, p. 16.-61-
The traditional methods for dealing with nutrition problems—giving
food stamps, coupons, or money to the poor and improving education and labelling—
are cornerstones of “nutrition policies” coannonly recommended. The other
items included in these policies are
(a) more research in the area of nutrition,
(b) increased nutritional surveillance, and
(c) improved food safety.
A nutrition policy could continue to use only these traditional remedies.
Increased income supplements or food stamps, in combination with a massive
nutrition education program, would have a definite positive impact on
nutrition in the United States. Such a policy would be costly, and the
traditional remedies are somewhat limited in their effectiveness. Poverty
assistance will subsidize consumption of nonnecessiti.es. Because of
information overload, education may not improve nutrition to the hoped-
for extent.
At any rate, a nutrition policy based on these traditional remedies
does not qualify as a “nutrition-baaed agricultural policy.” The traditional
remedies are essentially divorced from agricultural farm-price policy.
The recent discussion about nutrition policy has included proposals to
broaden these traditional remedies and to ba$e farm policy decisions on
nutritional impacts: I!Human nutrition must be the leading goal for ‘ood
and agricultural policies. ... No one could argue successfully to the
62/
contrary.” — But can agricultural policy in the United States be
&/ Philip L. White, American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
~. c&,, p. 803.-62-
designed to meet certain nutritional targets determined objectively
by nutrition scientists?
NUTRITION AS THE BASIS FOR AGR.ICXJLTUK4LPOLICY
Finally, we address the problem at hand: Can nutrition knowledge be
used as a basis for guiding production and distribution policies for






The nutrition problem is complex. Different people have
different nutritional requirements, different food con-
sumption habits , and different nutrition problems. A
person’s nutritional status cannot be defined in terms of
a deficiency or an oversufficiency of one or two nutrients
at any given point in time; the entire diet and nutritional
history must be considered.
Nutrition science provides a basis on which to act. Nutrition
scientists, though far from unanimity on many questions,
can agree on certain urgent nutritional problems.
The government is justified in intervening to influence
market decisions in order to improve nutrition. Specifically,
it may intervene to improve nutrition among the poor and to
provide information about nutrition.
One method of justifiable intervention is adjustment of
prices to encourage production and consumption of nutritious
foods and to discourage production and consumption of non-
nutritious foods.-63-
To these four premises, I would add a fifth:
(5) To increase (or decrease) consumption of a certain food, a
program must also increase (or decrease) production of the
commodity. We cannot work blindly on only the production
side or the consumption side of the market.
This may seem to be a trivial observation, but it is astonishing how
often it is overlooked. some specific suggestions for improving the nu-
tritional impact of government programs fail to consider the whole picture.
Eliminating price supports for overconsumed foods, for example, will not
63/
necessarily improve nutrition. — Suppose that nutritionists tell us
that the average American eats too much butter. On this recommendation,
we decide to lower the support price on butter. The commercial market price
of butter drops and government stocks decline. Buyers of butter on the
commercial market-buyers which include the “average American’’—purchase
more butter at the new lower price. Recipients of government butter—
children under the school lunch program and the foreign poor under P.L. 480—
consume less butter, but the market purchasers are the overconsumers and
the food distribution recipients may well need the calories, protein, and
vitamins that butter provides. If this is the case, lowering the butter
support price will harm general nutrition.
Other critics have urged programs which encourage production of
high-nutrition foods by raising prices of these foods:
63/ This effect is implied in many statements such as the one by
Mayer_@oted earlier concerning the need for “nutritional surpluses” (foot-
note 37).-64-
such
The production of milk with a lower fat content and a
higher protein content should be encouraged by amending milk
marketing orders so that milk prices are based on protein
64/ content as well as butterfat content. _
a policy, which results in higher prices to users and consumers of
nutritious components of foods , will result in decreased consumption
of these components. In 1974, a national grocery chain which bottles
its own milk changed its standards for whole milk to decrease butterfat
content and to increase protein content. This action, nutritionally de-
sirable, would have been discouraged by the proposed higher prices paid
for protein.
Policymakers intent on using nutrition as a basis for agricultural






How much of each commodity should be produced?
How can production at these levels
How will the food be distributed?
According to Don Paarlberg:
If nutrition were the sole desired
economist were called on to show how it
be dictated or encouraged?
objective and the
would be achieved,
the procedure would be fairly simple. He would prescribe
a diet agreed to by nutritionists. ... We would then pro-
vide this diet to the people, much as I used to prescribe
the rations for my cattle in my Indiana feedlot.
6&/
And it
would be a low-cost diet.
64/ D. S. Kronfeld, Supplement to Panel on Traditional Foods, White
House-~onference, o&, cit., p. 108.
‘t!Food and ECOtIOSIks2° 65/ Don Paarlberg, Journal of the American
Diete~c Association, Vol. 71, August 1977, p. 108.In reality, even with this single objective, the procedure would not be
simple.
The determination of the nutritional optimum quantity of food pro-
duced often is discussed as if it were an objective, scientific process.
As mentioned earlier, nutrition science contributes vital information about
proper levels of nutrient intake for individuals or groups and nutrient
composition of foods. However, scientific facts are not enough; important
political decisions or subjective judgments must be made. First, the
policymaker must decide how much weight to attach to foreign nutrition
problems. How much U.S. food will be shipped abroad? How much responsi-
bility should the United States take toward feeding the world’s hungry?
These are political questions.
The answers to these will allow the calculation of required amounts
of nutrients, but in what form will these nutrients be consumed? Will
required protein be made available in steak or as dried milk? Will con-
sumers get their Vitamin C from fruit or in artificial pill form? In
Paarlberg’s simple procedure, where the policymaker is concerned only
with nutrition, no weight is given to palatability: “The calcium might
come from calcium phosphate; calcium from milk costs three hundred times
as much. The Vitamin A might come from a synthetic fortifier. ... The
,,6&/
protein might be soybean meal.
t&/ Ibid., p. 108.-66-
The form in which the nutrient’s are consumed cannot be determined
solely on the basis of production costs per unit of nutrient. Palatability
also must be considered. Prohibition of any “traditional” foods because
they are not cost-effective nutrient sources will result quickly in a black
market supply of these foods, a market patronized by those who eat the
food for pleasure. Such a prohibition would also cause unemployment and
impoverishment among producers of these traditional foods and suppliers
of inputs to these producers and would harm, thereby, rural nutrition.
In no way are we assured that prescribing least-cost production of nu-
trients will result in perfect, or even improved, nutrition.
If, on the other hand, nutrition policymakers opt for the other
extreme —ideal palatability—food necessarily will be more expensive, more
costly to produce. Improvement of nutrition in the United States will
be at the expense of the third-world poor. The obvious compromise is to
encourage, but not stipulate, production and consumption of nutritious
traditional foods, and to discourage, but not prohibit, production and
consumption of nonnutritious foods.
A nutrition policy may have as its goal the production and con-
sumption of exact quantities of foods or may encourage more production and
consumption of some foods and less production and consumption of other foods.
In either case, a nutrition program must influence both production and
consumption.
There are many existing government programs which affect the domestiic
supplies of foods. The primary ways in which the quantity of a food







changing quantity produced domestically by altering farm
prices through deficiency payments or taxes,
changing quantity produced domestically by regulating
quantities of inputs,
changing quantity available domestically by encouraging or
discouraging imports or exports,
changing quantity available to consumers by changing the
levels of government-held stocks,
lowering quantity available on the market
quotas, and
increasing quantity produced domestically
technology which lowers relative costs of
some foods.
These are problematic solutions. Economists’
producer responses is not sufficiently advanced to







for example, prices received by producers. The most serious shortcoming
is the lack of complete information on cross-elasticities of supply—
how do producers of one food react to changes in price of another food?
A second difficulty exists when a nonnutritious food is a joint ‘,
product with a nutritious food. How can we encourage production of non-
fat dry milk and discourage production of butter or increase liver production
while decreasing meat production? To some extent, as mentioned above,
classified pricing systems which allow different prices for components of
a commodity based on their nutritional value may be used to address this prob-
lem. In some cases, such as healthful egg whites tied to harmful egg yolks,-68-
no solution is possible. In cases where classified pricing could have
an effect, the impact is likely to be minimal.
A third issue which must be faced in defining a nutritional food
production policy is the naturally occurring, year-to-year fluctuations
in food supply due to varying weather conditions and other unpredictable
“shocks” to the system. Assuming that ideal production levels can be
established and assuming that any given level of production can be
dictated, cm average, by government palicies, should the target averages
be set exactly at the ideal production levels with the full assurance
that actual production will be sometimes above, sometimes below this
ideal level? Or, should the target average be set so that actual production
will be at or above target levels most of the time? When the commodity in
question is storable for long periods of time, it may be possible to make
ideal levels of the commodity available on the.market every year by means
of a system of government-sponsored stocks. For perishable commodities,
random supply fluctuations present a real and vexing problem.
Finally, a production policy must be wary of placing control of the
food supply in the hands of individuals whom the government cannot control.
Heavy reliance on foreign food supply, or concentration of domestic supply
in the hands of a few huge producers, could result in monopoly prices
and, in the long run, could be detrimental to nutrition. “ If suppliers
of food organize into a cartel, there is no effective way to protect
consumers from a food shortage —a deliberate tightening of quantity of
67/ Berg, The Nutrition Factor, ~. cit., p. 55. —-69-
food supplied in order to extract higher
than the traditional desire of countries
68/
production. — Food suppliers, whether
prices. The issue here is broader
to be self-sufficient in food
foreign or domestic, must remain
responsive to the common weal as dictated by consumers or voters.
As noted earlier, programs designed only to influence production
often will have the opposite of the desired effect on consumption. For
example, increasing government purchases in order to spur production will
increase domestic consumption only if the increased purchases are distributed
domestically.
The simplest method (conceptually) of
food is some form of government rationing.
the ultimate middleman, requiring that all
controlling distribution of
The government could act as
food sold be sold to the
government and all food bought be bought from the government. The government
would sell, to each consumer, that amount of food which is his or her
nutritional optimum. Alternatively, the government could require each
individual to exchange a certain portion of his or her income for food stamps
which are redeemable only for nutritional quantities of foods. Food would
be sold only for stamps under such a plan. In either program, black markets
would thrive. To discourage trading or selling of food between individuals,
the government would have to design some method of supervising the actual
consumption of food. Any attempt on the part of the government to coerce
American citizens into consuming nutritional foods would fail; Americans
would not accept government dictatorship of their diets. As Paarlberg
says of rationing:
68_/ In his article, Paarlberg mentions only “self-sufficiency” as a
goal which may be in opposition to the goal of nutrition.-70-
That this would improve nu~rition is beyond doubt. It
has worked well for cattle and chickens , whicht in this
country, are fed at a better nutritional level than are the
people. The reason we can do it for cattle and chickens,
of course, is that they can’t vote. ...’ Obviously, the
American peo le will reject a prescribed diet, however
89/ nutritious. —
Policymakers could maintain the appearance of free consumer choice
by eschewing direct quantity rationing and adopting instead a program of
trial-and-error adjustments in consumer food prices—adjustments which
continue until consumers “freely” choose to consume foods in nutritionally
optimal quantities. Such a program of price adjustments would require an
extensive and enormously complicated system of taxes and subsidies.
A price policy to stipulate optimum nutrition would be ridiculously
complex. To be effective, such a policy must discourage or eliminate
black markets in food and coupons. The government is forced either to
subsidize the purchase of nonnecessitiea or to supervise food consumption.
The “correct” price must be determined and administered for each individual
in the economy. Prices for different forms of a basic commodity must be
nutritionally balanced: What shall the price of butter be, relative to the
prices of nonfat dry milk and whole millc;what should be the difference
between the price of raw carrots and the price of carrots in a TV dinner?
Quantities demanded of “finished” consumable food must be balanced with
quantities of raw commodity produced. Since demand for food is relatively
inelastic, the government would be forced to alter radically the existing
food price structure in order to have a significant impact on nutrition.
~/ Paarlberg, ~. cit., p. 108,-71-
The administrative and enforcement costs of this program would
be absurdly high. Furthermore, rationing by price is not fundamentally
different from other forms of rationing and thus is equally objectionable
from the standpoint of personal freedom. Is it any less an impingement
on freedom of personal choice to dictate quantities consumed by taxing
or subsidizing until the desired quantities are reached than to dictate
those quantities by some direct method?
Finally, we should consider the effects of a nutrition-based agri-
culture on government economic goals. As Mr. Richards, the Ohio farmer,
reminds us, “Agricultures role has changed. It’s not just a matter of
feeding people, but also supporting the economy. Any agricultural policy
in the future has to be heavily weighted to the export market, the balance
70/
of payments, and the support of the dollar.” — A nutrition policy might
also be inflationary, raising the average price paid for food.
We are led ineluctably to the conclusion that nutrition cannot serve
as the only basis for food production and distribution policy.
— Nutritionally optimal quantities of foods cannot be de-
termined objectively but must be determined politically.
— Economic knowledge about behavior of producers and con-
sumers is not sufficient to our needs —we cannot reliably
dictate, by means of a pricing system, quantities of foods
produced and consumed.
70/ Richards, in Farm Foundation,
p. 35r
Increasing Understands, ~. cit.,-72-
— The Holy Grail of nutrition, when pursued, leads us to
oppose other goals of agricultural policy—preservation
of the small farmer, maintenance of food security,
charity for the world’s poor, and liberty.
THE GOAL Ol?NUTRITION IN AGRICULTURAL POLICY
This does not mean, however, that nutrition cannot serve as one of
several conflicting goals of agricultural policy. The resolution of the
natural conflicts between domestic and foreign nutritional goals, between
nutrition and freedom of choice, between nutrition and the maintenance
of the small farmer —these conflicts properly are resolved by political
compromise; the final policy decisions properly are made by ehe citizenry
or their representatives. The important task facing the nutrition science
and economics professions is that of providing policymakers with useful
information about nutritional impact of their decisions.
There exist already macro models of the agricultural production
sector which can be used to project the probable impacts of government
~1
policy decisions on agricultural production. Attention should be
given to expanding these models in order to include the decisions of
consumers and the nutritional impacts. Timmer has indicated a way of
72/
effecting this expansion. —
~/ For a description of how these models are put together, see
George ‘E.R.ossmi.ller(cd.), Agricultural Sector Plannin& Michigan State
University, East Lansing, 1978.
~/ Timmer, ~. ~.-73-
For any individual (or group of similar individuals), the amount of
any food consumed during a period will depend on the price of that food,
the prices of other goods, the income of the individual, and the tastes
and preferences of the individual. Agricultural programs can influence
the amount of a given food eaten by the individual by affecting any
one of these four factors:
(1) The price of the food in question can be raised or lowered
in many ways —the support price, the deficiency payment,
the set-aside requirement, federal order minimum prices,
import and export policies~ and agricultural research;
all affect the consumer price of food.
(2) By similar methods, prices of other foods can be influenced.
(3) An individual’s income can be affected by prices of farm
commodities (if the individual is a farmer) or by food
stamps.
(4) Regulation of food advertising, inspection and grading, and
nutrition education programs affect an individual’s
tastes and preferences.
The econometric model can estimate the impact of a given government
action (1) on these four determinants of food consumption and, thereby,
(2) on the quantity of each food consumed by each individual or group.
These estimates will be made by economists; they will tell us what factors
influence food consumption and how government actions influence those
factors. These estimates will never be perfectly precise; at first, they
may widely miss the marks but &he methodology exists for refinement of these
economic predictions.-74-
We will look to nutrici.on science for answers to the following questions:
(l.) M thq above analysis on the effects of government policy
on food consumption, how shall we define demographic groups
with similar
(2) What are the
(3) What are the
nutritional needs and problems?
proper levels of nutrient i.ntalce for each group?
existing levels of nutrient intake for each group?
(4) How can we translate food consum]?tion into nutrient intake?
using answers to these questions, we can quantify the changes in
intake of all nutrients caused by anticipated government policy. In addition
to this information, policymakers will look to nutritionists for the answers
Lo two more questions:
(1) For a given group, does Che policy-induced change in intake
of a given nutrient represent an improvement or a deterioration
in nutrition for the group? ‘t
(2) For a given group, what nutrition problems are the most im-
portant?
In other words, is an improvement in intake of NuCrient A more important
than the exacerbation of a problem (intake too high or too low) in Nutrient
B?
73/ Instead of requiring that a change in nutrient intake be identified .
simply as an improvement or a deterioration, we could ask for a
quantification— ItThisnutrient improved 10 units, and that one improved
seven units.” In my opinionj such a refinement places an unnecessary re-
quirement on the nutrition science profession for unanimity of opinion.
Changes in agricultural policy will be sufficiently conservative that
resultant changes in nutrient intake will be small; only “marginal changes”
in nutrition will be caused by the change in intake of any nutrient.-75-
By incorporating economic and nutritional knowledge into the consumption
side of existing econometric models, these models could advise policymakers:
t!Th@ proposed policY (for example$ raising the price of fluid milk) will
improve nutrition in Groupa A and B (adult men above the poverty line and
the poor abroad) and will not harm Groups C and D (wheat farmers, high
school-aged children). However, the policy will have deleterious effects
on nutrition of Groups E and F (poor mothers, grade school children).”
(For a more formal discussion of how to expand existing econometric models
in order to measure nutritional impacts of government policies, see Appendix
D.) The policymaker would nor be required to adopt or reject the policy
change based on this information. The information would be considered
along with information on all other effects of the policy (such as the
effect on farm size, food security, inflation, balance of payments, etc.)
and a subjective, or political, determination would be made concerning
the proposed change.
Considerable research will be necessary to improve the validity of
projections made by such a model. Demand functions of individual demo-
graphic groups for foods must be estimated. “ Nutritional weights, to
be assigned to changes in intake of different nutrients, must be determined.
74/ tlToeffect an agricultural price policy requires price responses
for t~ population as a whole, while a food policy which includes nutrition
should have income-specific parameters.” Anne Tyler Rosenberger and
Harold Alderman, llEatimates of income-SpecifiC Price Response ‘or ‘se
in Policy Analysis,” unpublished paper, Cornell University, Department of
Nutrition. Also see Oey Astra Meesook, llTheImpact Of price Increases ‘n
Different Incoue Groups, !!Thammasat Universj.ty Faculty of Economics Discussion
Paper Series No. 48, December 1975.-76-
The job of making the computer model more realistic, especially by im-
proving estimates of group-specific cross-price supply and demand elasticities,
will be never-ending. Nutritionists also will be occupied in eliminating
some of the ambiguities and uncertainties about what are safe levels of
nutrient intake.
In spite of the need for further research, the agricultural sector
models could be expanded roughly in the near future, and the consumption-
nutrition side of the model could be continually refined as more information
becomes available. This kind of compromise approach to nutritional policy
should be preferred because it allows policymakers to take nutritional
impact into account in making decisions, but it does not require policy-
makers to ignore other important goals of agricultural policy. Consumer
advocates should see in this approach the promise of greater nutrition
knowledge input into the decision-making process. Commodity groups,
agribusiness, the bureaucracy, and other groups with an interest in traditional
agricultural policy should view this
and costly changes in the production
CONCLUSIONS
approach as a way of avoiding sudden
and distribution sectors of agriculture.
The nutrition problem is complex. Nutrition science provides an
imperfect but sufficient basia for policy decisions. Economic theory
identifies the reasons and possible methods for government intervention
and draws attention to the shortcomings of these possible methods. Applied
economics is not sufficiently advanced to give reliable advice on the proper
ways to manipulate prices in order to achieve a radical change in food-77-
consumption and production patterns. Nutrition cannot be the only goal of
agricultural policy; the achievement of nutrition, as a goal, runs contrary
to other goals of agricultural policy. Nutrition should be one of several
conflicting goals of agricultural. policy; it should, perhaps, be primus
inter pares. The important task facing the nutrition and social sciences
is to present information on nutritional impacts of policies so that the
political trade-offs can be made with a better understanding of policy
consequences.RIBL,IOGRAPHY
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Note: Footnotes are listed on page 83.
Source : Sir Stanley Davidson, et al. , Human Nutrition and Dietetics,
Churchill Livingston Pub. , New York, 1975, pp. 186-187.-86-
rrThe ages are from one birthday to another: e.g., 9 up to 12 is from the %h up to, but not including, the l?dr birthday. The
figures in ListTahk in general refer to the mid-point of the ranges, though th~ rorthe range 18tsp to 35 refer to the age 25 year%
and !br the range 18 up to 55, to 35 years ofa c.
f $ .%veagc fi~rm rcfatin tothe firsI year o hft.
-0
cThe bodv wei hrs of c ildrcn and adofesccnts arc averages and relate to London in 1965. (Tanner, W’hitcbouse and
Takaish.i, 1966). he body ~ei~hts of adtdss dono[ representavemge values; they are thoaeof the FAO(195’?0) reference
man and woman, with a nomtnal reduction for the elderly.
d .Awerage requirements relating to groups of individuals.
r \fegajoules ( ICPjoules). Calculated ~om the relation 1 kilocaforic U=4.186 kilojoules, and roustdcd to I decimal place.
JRcccrmmcndcd intakes cafcufawd as providing 10 per ccm of energy rquircments.
g The figures, calculated from energy requirements and the recommended intake of thiar?rh of 0.4 mg/ 1000 kcaI.
relate m groups of individ UIS.
h 1 n~otinic acid cqui~alent = I m available nicotinic acid or W mg t
f
~ta~hws.
i i retinol cquiialcnt = 1 pg rctino or 6 gg &carotcnc or 12 pg other blo ogwally aclivc carotcnoids.
j so dicta~ scssrce may be ncccssat-y for those adequately cxpoacd to sunlight, but the requircmsmt for the housebound may
be greater than that recommended.
k FM all three tnmcs!crs.
1These tigures appl y to inhtrs who arc nor breast fed. Infants who arc entirely breast fed receive small- quamities; these arc
sdquatc since absorption from breast mifk it higher.
n Fur the third trimester or+.APPENDIX B--88-
Table 2a. Nutritive value of food eaten per person in one day as a percent
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* Adapted from National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, Food
and Nutrition Board. Recommended Dietary Allowances. National Academy Sci. Pub.
1694. 7th Eds Rev. 1968.
a/ Average figures relating to the first year of life.
~ource: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, Food
Intake and Nutritive Value of Diets, Spring 1965, ARs-62-~8, Washington, D.C.,
March 1969.-89-
Table 2b. Nutritive value of food eaten per person in one day as a percent



























75 yrs and over ...
—
Nnber Vitamin
0!’ Food A Thia- RicD- Abcorb!c
brsons energy Protein Calcium Iron value mine fla,~in acid






















































































































































































* Adapted from National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, Food
and Nutrition Board. Recommended Dietary Allowances. National Academy Sci. Pub.
1694. 7th Ed. Rev. 1968.
a_/ Average figures relating to the first year of life.-90-
Table 2c. Nutritive value of food eaten per person in one day as a percent o;




cf Food A Thia- I?ibo - Ascorbic
group persons energy Protein Calcium Iron value mine flsvir. ac~~
(1)
/2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (12)
_Mle and female:
Under 1 year ~’ I :13
1. 1-2 years ..... ; 232
I :le 3-5 years ..... ,
I
6-8 years ..... \ 263
Male:
9-11 years .... i 116
i. 12-14 years . . . I _IT
I
15-17 years ... ~ 112
18-19 years ... I+>
20-34 years ... ; ?60
I
35-54 years ... ‘ 334
55-64 years ... / :.36
65-74 years ... ~ :05





9-11 years .... ~ 95
12-14 years ... 1 zoo








































































































































































* Adapted from National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, Food
and Nutrition Board. Recommended Dietary Allowances. National Academy Sci. Pub.
1694. 7th Ed. Rev. 1968.
a_/ Average figures relating to the first year of life.-91-
Table 2d. Nutritive value of food eaten per person in one day as a percent



















of Food A ‘lhia- Ribo- ASccr”o:c
zrsonsenergO-ProteinCalcium 1ron value mine flavi~. acid



















12-14 years ..... ‘ 430
15-17 years ..... 351
18-19 years ..... 13t?
20-34 years ..... 1,15L
35-54 years ..... ~,65?
55-64 years ..... 413
65-74 years ..... lLz























































































































* Adapted from National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, Food
and Nutrition Board. Recommended Dietary Allowances. National Academy Sci. Pub.
1694. 7th Ed. Rev. 1968.
~/ Average figures relating to the first year of life.APPENDIX C-93-
A COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE FOOD STAMP
DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES
An individual’s budget line shows the possible combinations of goods
which can be consumed by the individual at given prices. An income trans-





Here, I?nis the price of nutritious food, and I?.is the price of other
goods . As the individual’s income is increased from Y to Y*, the budget
line moves from B1 to B2.
If an individual is given food stamps of a face value Y* - Y, the
shift in the budget line will be the same, except maximum consumption












Q. Y/Pn Y*/ Pn Nutritious food
If the value of food stamps is less than the amount of income normally
allocated by the individual toward the purchase of nutritious food (if
Y* - Y < Qo), the distribution of food stamps will have exactly the same
effect as a distribution of money. This is the substitution problem
we examined in the discussion of food distribution programs.
If the value of the food stamps is greater than an individual’s
normal food budget (if Y* - Y > Qo), consumption of food may increase




Q. Q2Y/~Q1 Y*IPn Nutritious food-95-
An income transfer of Y* -
Q2, but, since food stamps
gency point at Q2 is not a
Y would increase food consumption from Q. to
can be used only to purchase food, this tan-
possible consumption point for the recipient
of Y* - Y worth of food stamps. The best such a recipient can do (in
the absence of arbitrage) is to spend all cash income on nonfood, buying
food only with stamps. This will put the individual at the corner of
his budget line, consuming quantity Q1 of food.
Food stamps are fungible and the individual can probably trade some,
but not all, stamps for cash. In this case, the budget line looks something




If we allow food stamp recipients to
$1 of money, the individual’s budget
buy $1.25 worth of food stamps with
line shifts like this (Bl to B2):-96-
Other goods
‘1
Y/Pn 1.25S! Nutritious food
n
‘-n
The individual.will buy food stamps
The value of the scamps will be quantity
cost of the stamps will be Q’l l Pn for a
(Q~ -Q\)Pn = .25 Q; l Pn if $1 will buy
redeemable for quantity Q1.
times price or Q1 “ Pn. The
total government subsidy of
$1.25 worth of food stamps. An
income transfer of a similar amount (Ql - Q\)Pn would result in a lower











u m I m n
~Qi Q2 Q1 Nutritious food-97-
Until recently, the federal food stamp program had a purchase re-
quirement but allowed purchases of food stamps in one of four sizes only—
one quarter, one half, three quarters, or all.of the maximum food stamp
allotment. The result is a “saw-toothed” budget line, with effects which
may be rarely different from the effects of an income transfer:
Other goods
IAPPENDIX D-99-
EXPANSION OF ECONOMETRIC MODELS TO EVALUATE
NUTRITIONAL IMPACTS
Quantity of any food Itgll consumed by individual or group “j” is a
normal demand function:
1?
gj = ‘F(yj’ ‘gj’ ‘Oj’ ‘II’‘~)
(1)
where




= price of food g to individual j,
P
oj
= price of other foods to individual j,
Pn = price of nonfoods, and
E. = individual or group characteristics (taates and preferences).
J
Income of each individual or group will be partly exogenous and





= exogenous income level and
Y* = effect of agricultural policy on the income of j.
j





= effect of agricultural policy on farm-related incomes and
t* =
‘j







be determined endogenously in
policy ‘variable.
food prices faced by consumer
the production side of the model.
j will be the market prices adjuated














market prices of food g and other foods o and
subsidies (positive or negative) paid to individual j
for consumption of food g and other foods o.
P: and P: are endogenously determined. S-k and S* are policy variables.
gj O’j
Price of nonfoods, Pn, is assumed to be exogenous and the same for all
individuals.
Tastes and preferences of individual j, E
.-1’
are also influenced by
government policies:




E! s exogenous component of preferences and
E? = influence of government policies concerning food advertising
and labelling on tastes and preferences of j.- 101 -
The nutritional status of individual j can be determined from his
consumption of food. Intake of nutrient i.by individual j is




Nij = intake of nutrient i by individual j,
%
= amount of nutrient i available from each unit of food g, and
)?
gj
= quantity of food g consumed by individual j.














fi(Hj, Aj> Vj> Jj> Sj,t_l)
ideal level of nutrient for individual or group j,
health statua of j,
accivity level of j,
environmental influences on j,
genetic factors influencing j, and
nutritional status in previous time period.
(8)
Ii .>
J ‘j’ ‘j’ and ‘j are exogenous”
A certain policy option will result in nutrient intake of N*
&j ‘
different from current intake N
ij“
If the policy moves intake of nutrient
i by group j closer to the ideal level S
ij’
the policy improves the nutrition
of the group, ceteris paribus. If the.policy moves actual intake away
from ideal intake, the policy harms nutrition, or the policy may have no
decisive impact on nutrition, either because the change in N
ij ‘a- 102 -
negligible or because the ideal level is indeterminant and the change from
N to N*. is of debatable help or harm.
ij lJ
IfS- N;jl s Sij - Nijl, let dummy variable D
i.j ij
(9)
take the value of 1.
If the nutritional consequences of a change from Ni.j
to I@
ij
are unknown or debatable, let D = O. ij
Now, we look to nutrition science to tell us which nutrition problems
are the most important for group j. By assigning a weight, Wij ‘
to the
importance to group j of changing intake of nutrient i, we can get a figure








impact of a policy change on nutrition of group j,
importance of nutrient i to group j, and
dummy variable showing the effects of the policy on
intake of nutrient i by group j.
> 0, the policy change will improve nutrition of group j. If
Ij ~ 0, nutrition of group j will be harmed. If 1. = O, the policy does
J
not change the nutritional status of group j in any way.